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This thesis consists of a summary and four self-contained papers. 
 
Paper [I] examines whether the implementation of a social safety net 
programme in Ethiopia has affected the value, risk and composition of 
farmers’ crop portfolios. The empirical analysis suggests that the value and 
risk of the crop portfolio have not been altered due to the programme. 
However, the programme seems to have brought about some changes in 
the land allocated to different crops.  
 
Paper [II] studies how a social safety net affects farmers’ (dis)investments 
in productive assets. More specifically, it studies how the Productive 
Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia has changed livestock and tree 
holdings.  The results indicate no significant effect on livestock holdings, 
but a significant increase in tree holdings.   
 
Paper [III] investigates if there is a problem of adverse selection in formal 
microlending in rural Bangladesh. The results indicate that farmers who 
only borrow formally have a shadow price of capital that is substantially 
higher than the average informal interest rate. This suggests that farmers 
that only borrow formally are perceived as poor credit risks by informal 
lenders.  
 
Paper [IV] explores the economic incentives surrounding the cultivation 
of opium poppy in Afghanistan. Specifically, it examines the impact of 
eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, 
and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. The 
results indicate that both these features are likely to affect the outcome of 
eradication policies. 
 
Keywords: Smallholder farming, Public policy, Informal risk strategies, 
Microcredit, Opium eradication, Development economics, Food policy.   
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  Introduction and summary  
1 Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers, all related to informal 
insurance- and credit strategies, public policy and smallholder farming in 
developing countries. 
 
Agricultural production is an inherently risky business where farmers are 
exposed to a range of hazards such as droughts, floods, crop failures and 
price variations. Agricultural production is also a business that requires 
large investments in the beginning of the season and hence the needs to 
transfer means over time are substantial. However, in many developing 
countries formal credit and insurance markets that can be used to manage 
risk and transfer means over time, are lacking or are insufficient. The 
reason why the credit and insurance markets are more likely to fail in 
developing counties is that, in addition to the problems of information 
asymmetries and moral hazard that are usually associated with these 
markets, it is often difficult to enforce contracts due to unclear property 
rights and poorly functioning legal systems in these areas.  
 
To cope in this environment, smallholder farmers in developing countries 
have developed a number of strategies to survive: they keep extra buffers 
that can be used when an adverse outcome occurs, they engage in 
activities where the risk is low, they make use of informal credit systems, 
they form contracts where the risk is shared between stakeholders and so 
forth. 1 These informal insurance and credit strategies are integral parts of 
the rural economy: they, at least partially, fill the farmers’ need to insure 
                                                       
1 For a literature review of risk strategies see e.g. Alderman and Paxson, (1992) 2    Introduction and summary 
against risk and smooth consumption over time and they have survived in 
areas where other options have failed. However, at times these informal 
systems are not enough, and when they fail the consequences can be 
devastating. Even under normal circumstances, it is difficult to get an 
efficient allocation of resources and smooth consumption over time 
without use of well functioning credit and insurance markets. It is often 
argued that the low productivity in agriculture that can be seen in some 
parts of the world today is due to the difficulties to handle risk and 
transfer of income over time: income is traded for risk reduction at 
substantial cost and credit constraints prevent the farmers from making 
investments that are of importance for the future flow of income. In this 
environment, particular policies are carried out; some intended to reduce 
risk exposure, some to increase productivity, some to maintain law and 
order, and others for other purposes. The question is then, what happens 
when policy interventions take place in a context where informal credit 
and insurance strategies are already established? Do the formal institutions 
replace informal risk strategies (Paper [1] and Paper [2])? Are the new 
formal institutions as functionally viable as the informal institutions (Paper 
[3])? Also, how do the informal strategies affect the outcome of the 
policies (Paper [4])? These are the main questions that are reflected upon 
in this thesis. 
 
The rest of the introduction is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
why formal insurance and credit strategies often fail in developing 
counties. Section 3 describes the different informal insurance and credit 
strategies that are the focus of this thesis. Section 4 describes the main 
policies that are of interest. Section 5 summarizes the papers, and this is 
where the strategies and policies are related. Introduction and summary    3 
2  Why the formal insurance and credit markets fail 
  
In many developing countries, legal systems function poorly and it is 
difficult to enforce formal contracts. This makes it difficult for farmers to 
use land as collateral when borrowing money, even if property rights to 
land are clearly defined. In addition to this, land rights are frequently 
unclear, exacerbating the problems. In theory, formal lenders can reduce 
their risk by collecting information about potential borrowers; however, 
information gathering is costly and the costs need to be recouped through 
the interest charged on the loans, making these loans prohibitively costly 
for many farmers. Thus, access to formal credit is a problem in many rural 
areas.  
 
For similar reasons, access to formal insurance is problematic for many 
farmers in developing countries. Insurance creates a moral hazard 
problem, where farmers who insure have less incentive to act so as to 
avoid the negative outcome. More importantly, however, the farmers who 
are most likely to insure are those who are most likely to need the 
insurance, either because their farm has poor characteristics that make the 
risk of a crop failure high or because they have personal characteristics 
that increase the risk that their crops will fail. This creates an adverse 
selection problem for insurers, where higher premia will drive out the best 
remaining customers (since they are the ones who are least likely to need 
the insurance) and make the remaining pool of customers even worse. In 
developed countries, insurance companies collect information about 
potential customers, in order to reduce the risk of insuring poor risks, and 
use this information to tailor insurance premia to the characteristics of the 
customer; however, such information gathering is costly, and in rural areas 4    Introduction and summary 
in developing countries this makes the premia prohibitively high so that 
smallholder farmers cannot access formal insurance. 
 
3  Informal insurance and credit strategies 
 
In this thesis, five types of risk and/or credit strategies are of special 
interest: activity choices, asset buffers, informal lending, sales on futures 
markets and sharecropping arrangements.  
 
In Paper [1], the focus is on the choice of income generating activities as a 
means of managing risk. In the absence of functioning insurance and 
credit markets, the optimal portfolio of income generating activities would 
consist of a number of different activities with the same mean income but 
whose risks are uncorrelated. Compared to a less diverse portfolio of 
activities, this would reduce the total income risk without affecting the 
mean income. However, in practice the scope for choosing activities with 
low correlation in terms of risk can be limited. For example, if there is a 
poor harvest, many different crops usually fail simultaneously, and the 
possibility of finding off-farm employment is reduced because of shallow 
labour markets. In order to avoid major shortfalls in consumption, 
farmers may therefore be forced to choose activities with low risk at the 
expense of lower income to avoid income fluctuations (Dercon, 1996). 
The choice of how much income to sacrifice in order to reduce the 
exposure to risk will not only depend on the degree of risk aversion but 
also the opportunities to smooth consumption ex-post in case something 
happens (Alderman and Paxson, 1992). A number of studies have found 
that if households have possibilities to smooth income fluctuations ex-post 
by having access to consumption credit or liquid assets, they are more Introduction and summary    5 
prone to take up high-risk high-yield activities, e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1990), Morduch (1990), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Dercon 
(1996) and Lamb (2002).  
 
In Paper [2], the focus is on the asset strategy to cope with risks. This 
strategy is based on building up the stock of assets in good times in order 
to deplete them during bad times. Hence, the strategy can basically be 
seen as inter-temporal consumption smoothing through asset building. 
Two assets that are frequently mentioned in the literature, as potential 
buffers to income fluctuations, are livestock and trees (Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1995; Fafchamps et al., 1998; McPeak, 2004; 
Delacote, 2007). Although these assets may fill important roles as buffers 
against income shocks, there are shortcomings associated with using them 
as a store of value over time. For example, if the markets are shallow, the 
price of livestock is likely to be low when the need to sell them is the 
highest; furthermore, the long time horizon for growing trees makes them 
a rather illiquid asset. Hence, there is a scope for better allocation of 
resources through other types of insurance systems. The question is, 
however, not unproblematic. In the theoretical framework developed by 
Deaton (1989, 1991) and Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), it is shown 
that in the absence of functioning credit and insurance markets, risk 
averse households will save even though they have high discount rates. 
However, when the future income uncertainty is reduced, consumption 
will increase at the expense of investments in assets; these are assets that 
may in themselves be important for rural development and reduction of 
poverty. Thus, less exposure to risk can in this situation lead to fewer 
investments in productive assets since the motives for precautionary 
savings have been reduced. An important thing to note here, though, is 6    Introduction and summary 
that liquidation of productive assets may not be the outcome of a planned 
strategy for risk management; it can also be a forced outcome due to lack 
of alternatives to manage a negative income shock and where the 
distressed sales seriously harm future income possibilities. In this 
situation, less exposure to risk will only protect the assets in times of 
negative income shocks and there is no reason for reducing the 
investments in these assets.  
 
In Paper [3], the focus is on the use of informal credit markets as a means 
to reduce liquidity constraints to make investments in agriculture at the 
beginning of the season. An important question to reflect upon in this 
context is: how come the formal credit markets in many rural areas in 
developing countries are often lacking or insufficient whilst the informal 
credit markets continue to survive? In his famous article, “The Market for 
‘Lemons’”, Akerlof (1970) makes an illustrative example of the inherent 
problem in credit markets. He describes the credit markets in India, where 
the interest rate is significantly higher in the rural areas than in the city, 
and thus poses the question: How can these differences in interest rate 
persist without someone using the possibility to make arbitrage? The 
answer, the author argues, lies in the information asymmetries: if an 
arbitrageur tries to profit from the price difference, he will suffer from the 
fact that he has no information on which borrowers are good credit risks, 
and which borrowers are not. He will therefore attract all the ‘lemons’, i.e. 
the poor credit risks. This problem is inherent in credit markets, but is 
worse in areas where contracts are difficult to enforce so that lenders 
cannot demand collateral (and where lenders cannot collect information 
on potential borrowers). Informal lenders, on the other hand, who are 
based in the community in question and pursue lending as a side activity, Introduction and summary    7 
have the advantage that they often know the individual borrowers and 
have prior information on their behavior; by using this information, they 
can operate in communities where formal credit is likely to fail. 
 
In Paper [4], one of the focuses is on sales of crops on futures markets as 
an informal credit and insurance strategy. This strategy is simply based on 
selling crops prior to harvest at a fixed price on a futures market. After 
harvest, the crop is delivered to the lender who can resell it on the market 
at a higher price. By selling crops on futures markets the farmer can 
obtain credit and thereby reduce liquidity constraints to make investments 
or smooth consumption over the year. Depending on the type of contract, 
such an arrangement can also provide risk sharing if the lender takes on 
some or all of the loss in case of a crop failure. However, the efficiency of 
futures markets will depend on the structure of the market. Considering 
that many agricultural markets are shallow, which would make the risk for 
a local supplier of credit extremely high, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that lenders would prefer to give advances on crops that have a high value 
and that are easy to store and to transport, as this would spread the risk 
and the law of big number more easily can be applied. Unfortunately, in 
some areas this has stimulated cultivation of illegal crops such as opium, 
which happen to exhibit exactly these features. 
 
Another risk strategy in focus in Paper [4] is sharecropping arrangements. 
In a sharecropping arrangement the landlord and tenant divide the 
agricultural output according to some predetermined rule. It can easily be 
shown that compared to the situation with perfect insurance markets, land 
rental markets and labour markets, sharecropping leads to under-provision 
of labour and therefore a lower overall profit (Ellis, 1993). This is because 8    Introduction and summary 
the sharecropping tenant will have less incentive to work when he only 
keeps part of the marginal product of labour. It has also been found that 
sharecropping arrangements can lead to perverse outcome of public 
policies. For example, Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) show that under 
some circumstances, it is optimal for the landlord to resist technological 
innovations. The historical persistence of these, seemingly sub-optimal, 
sharecropping arrangements have long puzzled economists and therefore 
a number of theories for its existence have been developed (Singh, 2000). 
One important explanation that has been put forward is that 
sharecropping contracts allow for risk sharing between landlords and 
tenants. If the tenant were to rent the land, he would take the entire risk 
of crop failure and price variations. If the landowner were to hire farm 
labour, on the other hand, he would take the entire risk but would also 
need to hire managerial staff to oversee the farm workers, which can be 
prohibitively expensive in some regions. Thus, sharecropping creates 
better incentives for effort from the workers than a hired-labour setup 
would, but also permits better risk sharing than a hired-land setup would. 
Sharecropping cannot be explained by risk sharing and considerations of 
labour monitoring alone; there are combinations of fixed-rent and wage 
contracts that could spread the risk equally well. However, such contracts 
quickly become quite complicated to monitor and enforce, and in a 
situation where the transactions costs linked to monitoring and 
enforcement are high, a sharecropping arrangement may be more cost 
effective in practice (Ellis, 1993).  
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4  Policy interventions in the rural economy 
 
4.1  The PSNP program in Ethiopia 
 
One means for policymakers to reduce the impacts of a crop failure on 
farmers is to provide public work in rural areas, either limited to situations 
when a widespread crop failure occurs or on a more regular basis. Ideally, 
such food-for-work or cash-for-work programs can reduce the risk that 
farmers will have to sell off productive assets in times of poor harvests; if 
they are predictable enough, they may also affect the composition of 
farmers’ crop portfolios in the direction of more risky but higher-yielding 
crops. Thus, such programs can potentially alleviate several of the 
problems discussed earlier that are linked to the lack of formal insurance. 
These types of programs have gained increasing popularity over the last 
decade, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Barrett et al., 2004). The largest 
such program currently in operation is the Productive Safety Net Program 
(PSNP) in Ethiopia. 
 
Food insecurity has been a recurrent problem in Ethiopia. Historically, 
this problem has been tackled with emergency relief on a more or less 
annual basis. In an attempt to get away from these temporary measures 
and to give the famers a longer planning horizon, the Ethiopian 
government, together with a number of donors, launched the PSNP in 
2005. The program operates with an annual budget of US$500 million and 
reaches more than 7 million Ethiopians. This makes the program one of 
the largest ever in African history (Gilligan et al., 2008). The general idea 
of the program is to provide the most food insecure households with 
public work during the agricultural slack season. The extra income or food 10    Introduction and summary 
received from this public work is intended to enable participants to cover 
food shortages, and to protect productive assets that otherwise would 
have been sold in times of negative income shocks. 
 
The public works that are conducted within the program is supposed to 
generate public goods and can for example be construction of roads, 
planting of trees or building of stone terraces for soil conservation. 
Besides the provision of public works, the program also has a minor 
component for food insecure people that are unable to work; these 
households are provided with unconditional direct support (MoARD, 
2004, 2006). The PSNP is a part of a wider program for food security in 
Ethiopia, the rest of the activities in this program are basically called 
Other Food Security Programs (OFSP) where the main component is 
provision of credit (Slater et al., 2006). 
 
With the exception of its larger size and longer planning horizon, the main 
features of the PSNP are the same as those for other food-for-work and 
cash-for-work programs. The potential for these kinds of programs to 
reduce poverty are substantial; however, so are the potential pitfalls. The 
program creates a demand for labour that would otherwise have been 
unemployed, but it may also compete for labour used in on-farm 
activities. The program may reduce liquidity constraints that are likely to 
be substantial at the beginning of the farming season; leading to 
opportunities to invest inputs that otherwise would not have been 
possible. However, there is also a risk that the provision of food through 
the program reduces the demand for food on the local market, leading to 
lower prices and reduced incentives for investments in own production. Introduction and summary    11 
The list of potential benefits, but also potential problems, can be made 
even longer. 
 
The main literature on food-for-work programs has focused on how well 
these programs target the poor, whether they stimulate investments in 
productive assets (such as soil conservation, improved inputs and 
production technology, livestock and so forth) and the quality of the 
public goods created in these programs (see Barrett et al., 2004, for a 
review of the literature). Less attention has been given to the relationship 
between these programs and informal risk strategies. Dercon and 
Krishnan (2003) is an exception; they study the effects of food aid and 
food-for-work programs on informal-risk sharing between households 
and find some evidence that the programs actually weaken the informal 
risk sharing arrangements. 
 
Paper [1] and Paper [2] studies the effects of food-for-work programs on 
the informal risk strategies of income skewing and asset buffers. 
 
4.2 Formal  micro-lending 
 
It has long been recognized that credit is important for rural development. 
However, as described above, information asymmetries and difficulties to 
enforce contracts have made provision of this formal credit problematic. 
In the 1970s, many governments and foreign donors provided cheap 
formal credit to small-scale farmers in developing countries. However, for 
the reasons discussed above, these programs tended to attract poor credit 
risks and governments were reluctant to enforce contracts for fear of 
alienating the farmers, leading to poor repayment rates. Therefore, these 12    Introduction and summary 
credit programs only survived thanks to government subsidies. When 
subsidies were removed as part of fiscal retrenchment programs in the 
1980s, many of these credit institutions collapsed. Thus, attempts to 
provide cheap formal credit in rural areas have frequently failed in the 
past. 
 
Lately, microcredit institutions have gained increasing popularity and in 
2006, the micro-credit organization, Grameen Bank, together with its 
founder, Muhamud Yunus, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The 
general idea behind these types of micro-credit institution is that 
participants form groups that are made jointly responsible for each other’s 
loan. This way of organizing the loans is an attempt to make use of village 
knowledge and peer pressure to avoid the inherent information 
asymmetries between lenders and borrowers and to reduce the cost of 
contract enforcement. Considering the trouble encountered by formal 
small-scale credit schemes in the past, it is interesting to study whether the 
formal micro-lending institutions that are operating today are as 
functionally viable as the informal lenders. 
 
Previous literature has focused on studying the functioning of the formal-
micro lending systems by comparing the outcomes under different setups 
of these systems (Tedeschi, 2008). Less attention has been given to 
studying how effective they are in relation to the informal lenders; in the 
few cases where this has been done, studies have focused on aggregate 
indicators such as overall profitability and performance (Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak, 2008) rather than on studying suitability of individual 
borrowers. When studies have looked at characteristics of individual 
borrowers, the focus has been on identifying determinants of borrowers’ Introduction and summary    13 
choice of credit source (Barslund and Tarp, 2008), rather than on whether 
lenders are equally successful in identifying low-risk borrowers. 
 
Considering that many of the new micro-lending organizations have 
abandoned the group-lending setup, and that many of the established 
microlending organizations are doing the same (thus, for instance, 
Grameen Bank has shifted from group lending to individual lending), it is 
interesting to see if the formal micro-lending organizations are successful 
in their selection of borrowers, or if the adverse selection problems faced 
by previous small-scale formal credit schemes still remains. The success of 
formal micro lending is studied in Paper [3]. 
 
4.3  Opium Eradication in Afghanistan 
 
As noted earlier, risk will affect the composition of farmers’ crop 
portfolios. In the case of illegal crops such as coca or opium, governments 
may deliberately seek to increase the riskiness of these crops through 
eradication programs. The intention is, of course, that increased risk will 
cause farmers to shift to cultivation of legal crops instead. However, the 
illegal crops often play an important role in the rural economy; thus, 
eradication policies may interact with informal rural institutions in an 
unintended manner. 
 
Today, Afghanistan accounts for the lion’s share of the world’s 
production of opium (UNODC, 2009). The high level of production is of 
international concern not only due to the health problems related to its 
usage, but also due to its contribution to insecurity, instability and 
corruption, both within and outside Afghanistan’s borders (Clemens, 14    Introduction and summary 
2007). To combat the opium production in Afghanistan, substantial 
resources have been spent on source country counter-narcotic strategies. 
Among these strategies, eradication of opium poppy has been one of the 
most important. However, eradication of opium poppy is highly 
controversial. Advocates argue that a credible threat of eradication is 
necessary for farmers and landowners to refrain from opium cultivation, 
while critics argue that eradication is inefficient and often even 
counterproductive (Blanchard, 2009). To predict the outcome of 
eradication strategies, it is important to understand the role of opium in 
the rural economy. Opium cultivation does not only provide farmers with 
an extra source of income in areas where the number of livelihood 
options is limited, it has also been an important means for farmers to 
obtain credit and land. The credit is obtained through sales on futures 
markets through a system called salaam. In this system, the opium poppy is 
sold prior to harvest, usually to shopkeepers or traders, at a significantly 
lower price than the market price. After harvest, the poppy is delivered to 
the lender who can resell it and thereby make a profit on the price 
difference. Opium has also come to play a role in the land market as 
landlords have been found to prefer sharecroppers that are willing to grow 
opium poppy (Mansfield, 2003). 
 
Although there have been some studies of the effect of eradication on 
illegal crop production at the aggregate level, there are few in-depth 
studies of the choice of growing an illegal crop at the farm level. Ibanez’ 
studies (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) are exceptions; she investigates the choice 
of growing coca both theoretically and empirically. The main conclusions 
of these studies are that the decision of whether to grow coca or not can 
be explained by economic incentives, lack of options, poverty, moral Introduction and summary    15 
considerations, social norms, legitimacy and religious beliefs. However, 
two important aspects of the choice are left out of in these studies, namely 
that of how imperfect credit and land markets affect the outcome of 
eradication policies. Those aspects are likely to be particularly important in 
an Afghan context.  
 
This is where Paper [4] contributes by studying the effects of opium 
eradication under different credit and land tenure systems. In the next 
section, the risk strategies and economic policies are connected by the 
summary of the papers. 
 
5  Summary of the Papers 
 
Summary of Paper [1] 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if a social safety net has the 
potential of breaking the vicious circle of risk avoidance and low 
productivity in African agriculture. The underlying hypothesis is that if 
farmers are assured of always reaching a minimum level of consumption, 
they may be willing to engage in activities with higher risk and higher 
average return.  
 
This hypothesis is investigated by studying the effects of the PSNP in 
Ethiopia on the value, risk and composition of crops in the farmer’s crop 
portfolio. The theoretical outline suggests that the more the safety net can 
reduce how much of the income variability that spills over in consumption 
variability, the larger share of the income portfolio will be allocated to 
crops with higher average risk and higher average return. The theoretical 16    Introduction and summary 
result is, however, not clear-cut; the outcome will also depend on how the 
safety net affects the availability of inputs which, in turn, affects the 
marginal profitability of land devoted to different crops.  
 
The empirical analysis is based on household panel data from the Amhara 
region in the Ethiopian highlands. The panel structure of the data allows 
for empirical methods that can control for selection on time invariant 
unobserved variables into the program. The effects of the safety net on 
the value and risk in the crop portfolio is studied using a Just-Pope 
production function and the allocation of land is studied in a set of 
acreage response models.  
 
The empirical results indicate that the program has brought about some 
changes in the farmers’ choice of income activities. For example, the area 
allocated to perennials, which in this region are crops with high value and 
high variability, has increased. This is in line with previous studies that 
suggest that ability to ex-post smooth consumption lead to an income 
portfolio with higher risk and higher average return. The results also 
indicate some further minor reallocations of land devoted to different 
crops that cannot so easily be traced back to any specific risk-value 
pattern. However, no significant effect from program participation could 
be found on the mean value and risk of the total crop portfolio. This 
result could be because the program has had no impact on the crop 
portfolio, but it could also be due to a number of contradicting forces that 
are at play at the same time such as for example changes in the timing of 
input usage. The lack of results could also be due to the short period of 
running of the program; the increased farming of perennials may have Introduction and summary    17 
greater impact in future, when the perennial plants are fully grown and 
begin to produce at full output. 
 
Summary of Paper [2] 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study how a social safety net affects 
investments in productive assets. These effects are of interest as 
investments in productive assets can be an important way for farmers to 
climb out of poverty. However, although the intention of the social safety 
net may be to protect productive assets in times of negative income 
shocks, there is a risk that the safety net crowds out investments in 
productive assets. This can happen if the role of these assets is to work as 
buffers against income shocks and if this role is now played by the safety 
net. Hence, to further explore the underlying mechanisms, this paper also 
contributes to the literature by studying the role of these assets in terms of 
ex-post and ex-ante risk management and if this role has been affected by 
the implementation of the social safety net. 
 
The data used in this paper is the same panel household data set from the 
Ethiopian highlands as in Paper [1]. The empirical analysis is based on 
regression analysis of the effects of PSNP, income shocks, risk aversion 
and their interaction on changes in livestock and tree holdings. This allows 
for investigation of i) the direct effect of PSNP on investments in 
productive assets; ii) the role of these productive assets as buffers against 
income shocks, i.e., their role in terms of ex-post risk management; iii) the 
role of productive assets in terms of ex-ante risk management; and iv) if 
and how these potential roles of productive assets have been affected by 
the safety net. 18    Introduction and summary 
 
The results indicate no significant effect of the PSNP on livestock 
holdings. Furthermore, it seems as if livestock holdings are reduced in 
times of negative income shock (supporting the buffer hypothesis) but 
that risk aversion is not a determinant of investments in it. No significant 
support was found for the PSNP affecting the role of livestock as buffers. 
When it comes to tree holdings, the program seems to have led to 
increased investments in tree holdings. The results also suggest, contrary 
to the a priori belief, the less risk averse the household is, the higher the 
investments in trees. Income shocks did not seem to result in 
disinvestments in trees. These results are interesting as they suggest that 
investment in trees, with their long planning horizon and illiquid nature is 
seen as a risky investment, but that the social safety net enables farmers to 
invest in these kinds of productive assets. However, the short time in 
which the program has been running should be kept in mind. 
 
Summary of Paper [3] 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore if there is a problem of adverse 
selection in formal micro-lending. This is done by studying whether the 
informal lenders, who can be assumed to have better information about 
the individual borrower, would be willing to lend money to those farmers 
who borrow formally.  
The theoretical outline departs from the assumption that the informal 
lender will lend money to a farmer as long as the expected profit from 
lending to this farmer is at least as great as the expected profit from 
lending to other farmers. This means that in optimum, where the expected 
profits from loans to different famers are equalized, farmers who are Introduction and summary    19 
perceived as worse credit risk will be offered higher interest rates than 
those farmers that are perceived as good credit risks.  
 
The informal lenders’ perception of an individual farmer as a credit risk 
can then be explored by studying the farmer’s shadow price for capital. If 
a farmer has a shadow price that is higher than the average formal interest 
rate but lower than the average informal interest rate, this is an indication 
that the farmer is credit constrained but chooses not to borrow informally 
because most of his credit needs are met by the formal loans. If the 
farmer has a higher shadow price than the average informal interest rate, 
this is an indication that the famer would be willing to borrow at the 
informal interest rate offered to other farmers, but is not offered this 
interest rate as he/she is perceived as a poor credit risk by the informal 
lenders.     
 
The empirical analysis is based on household data from shrimp framers in 
the Khulna district in Bangladesh, where formal and informal credit 
systems continue to coexist. The shadow price approach, originally 
developed by Lau and Yotopoulos (1971), is used to empirically study 
difference in shadow prices between farmers who only borrow formally 
and those who also use informal credit.  
 
The results indicate that all farmers are credit constrained, i.e. all farmers 
have a higher shadow price that is higher than the formal interest rate. 
However, the shadow price of capital for those farmers who only borrow 
formally is substantially higher than the average informal interest rate, and 
is also substantially higher than the shadow price for the farmers who also 
borrow informally. This result suggests that the problem of adverse 20    Introduction and summary 
selection that has troubled formal small-scale credit in the past remains an 
issue for the current formal microfinance institutions, and that these 
formal institutions need to find other routes to attain the information that 
the informal lenders possess. 
 
Summary of Paper [4] 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore how different kinds of credit 
markets and land tenure systems affect the outcome of opium eradication 
policies, both in terms of area allocated to opium poppy and in terms of 
the distribution of the cost and benefits between landlords and tenants. 
More specifically, it is studied how the fact that opium can be used as a 
means to obtain credit and that the crops often are produced in 
sharecropping arrangements, affects the outcome of increased risk of 
eradication. 
 
The issues are explored by theoretically modeling the farmers’ crop choice 
under different circumstances. The main modeling framework is based on 
a two-period inter-temporal utility maximization problem, where the 
farmer chooses how to allocate land between opium production and 
another agricultural good, and how to allocate consumption between the 
two time periods. It is assumed that the decisions are made at the 
beginning of the first period and that the harvest is realized in the second 
period. It is also assumed that the farmer faces a risk that all opium is 
eradicated in the second period. 
 
The results from the baseline model, with functioning credit and land 
rental markets, suggest that an increased risk of eradication leads to less Introduction and summary    21 
area being allocated to opium poppy. Hence, under these circumstances, 
the eradication strategy is likely to have the intended effects. 
 
However, when it is assumed that the only way to obtain credit is through 
sales of opium at a futures market, the analysis suggests that the outcome 
of increased risk of eradication is no longer unambiguous but will depend 
on the farmer’s degree of risk aversion. If the farmer is sufficiently risk 
averse, an increased risk of eradication will actually lead to more area 
being allocated to opium poppy. 
 
Furthermore, the results indicate that under the above mentioned credit 
system and when the opium poppy is produced in sharecropping 
arrangements, the tenant will always lose from increased risk of 
eradication. However, if the tenant is sufficiently risk averse, the landlord’s 
expected profit may actually increase with increased risk of eradication. 
     
From a policy perspective, both for understanding the outcome of 
previous strategies and for forming future counter-narcotic policies, these 
results are worth reflecting on as there is a risk that the eradication policy 
can actually be counter-productive if the role of opium in the rural 
economy is not taken into proper account. 
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In this paper, we examine whether a minimum level of ensured 
consumption from a social safety net has the potential of breaking the 
vicious circle of risk avoidance and low return in African agriculture. We 
study how the implementation of a social safety net programme in 
Ethiopia has affected the value, risk and composition of farmers’ crop 
portfolios. The effects of programme participation on the value and risk 
of the crop portfolio are examined in a Just-Pope production function, 
and the effects of programme participation on composition of the crop 
portfolio are tested in a set of acreage response models. The empirical 
analysis is based on unique household panel data that allow us to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity. No significant effect on the value and risk 
of the crop portfolio could be found. However, the programme seems to 
have brought about some changes in the land allocated to different crops. 
The greatest effect is towards increased cultivation of perennials, which 
are high-value, high-risk crops in this part of Ethiopia.   
 
 
Keywords: Crop choice, Social safety nets, Food-for-work programmes, 
PSNP, Ethiopia 




In this paper we examine whether a minimum level of ensured 
consumption from a social safety net has the potential of breaking the 
vicious circle of risk avoidance and low productivity in African agriculture. 
We study how the implementation of the Productive Safety Net 
Programme, a social safety net programme in Ethiopia, has affected the 
value, risk and composition of farmers’ crop portfolios. 
 
In the development debate, it is often emphasised that the difficulties of 
managing risk are an important reason for the low productivity in African 
agriculture (see e.g. World Bank, 2007). The argument put forward is that, 
since unexpected shortfalls in income cannot be handled through credit or 
insurance markets, farmers are often forced to opt for strategies that 
reduce the risk of starvation but may trap them in poverty.  
 
A number of previous studies have found that farmers who have access to 
consumption credit, liquid assets or off-farm income that can be used to 
maintain a certain level of consumption during negative income shocks 
are more likely to choose an income portfolio with higher average risk and 
higher average return, while farmers without these opportunities are more 
likely to resort to income activities with low risk and low average return.1 
 
                                                       
1 See e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), Morduch (1990), Rosenzweig and Binswanger 
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A social safety net is likely to have a similar effect on the production 
pattern. If farmers know that they will at least reach the subsistence level 
of consumption – even if there is a bad year in production – they may be 
more willing to engage in activities with a higher average return and higher 
risk. However, few, if any, studies have been made in this field.  
 
The effects of a social safety net on crop production are, however, 
ambiguous and are likely to depend on how that net is designed. In many 
developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, safety nets are 
designed so that participants in programmes are assured of a minimum 
level of food or money in exchange for work in social programmes during 
a given period – which is the case with the programme studied in this 
paper. When the safety net is designed in this manner, a number of 
possible effects it may have on the value, risk and composition of farmers’ 
crop portfolios can be identified.  
 
The insurance function of such programmes may not only lead farmers to 
choose a crop portfolio that contains a larger share of crops with higher 
value and risk (which in turn affect the value and risk of the total crop 
portfolio), it can also increase labour productivity by ensuring that 
household members have adequate food and nutrition throughout the 
year. The increased labour productivity can directly increase the output 
(and, hence, the total value of the crop portfolio) and reduce the variation 
in output at the same time. 
 Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   3 
 
The safety net can also affect the availability of inputs by reducing 
liquidity constraints (so that farmers can more easily purchase inputs), but 
also by competing with labour use in own farming. These changes in input 
availability can directly affect both the output and variation in it. For 
example, if more capital is available to make investments at the beginning 
of the season, it may increase the output and reduce the variation; on the 
other hand, if farmers are employed in public work during times that are 
critical for crop production on the farmer’s own farm, there is a risk of 
reduced output and increased variation in output. The availability of 
inputs may also affect the relative attractiveness of growing different 
crops, depending on their relative input intensities. It is, for example, 
likely that crops that are more capital-intensive but less labour-intensive 
become more attractive. Again, the resulting reallocation  of land to 
different crops can indirectly affect the value and variation of the total 
crop portfolio. 
 
Another possible effect of the safety net is that, if workers are paid in 
food, it can crowd out local food production by increasing the supply of 
food and suppressing the prices of food crops.  
 
Thus, depending on the design of the programme, there can be several 
different types of effects on agricultural production, and the net impact is 
not clear. 
 
The effect of food-for-work (FFW) programmes on agricultural 
production is an ongoing debate and the empirical results are mixed (see 4  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
e.g. Bezu and Holden (2008) and Barrett et al. (2004)). The main focus in 
the literature has been on the effects of these programmes on output and 
input usage, while less attention has been given to the effects on risk and 
composition of the crop portfolio. Bezuneh et al. (1988) is an exception: 
they use linear programming to study the effects of FFW on agricultural 
production in rural Kenya. Their results indicate that participation in FFW 
programmes can shift agricultural production from maize to millet, where 
millet is the more profitable crop. However, to our knowledge, there has 
been no study to date of how FFW programmes affect risk in crop 
portfolios. This paper is an attempt to fill that gap. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the 
programme studied in this paper. Section 3 outlines a brief theoretical 
model of how the programme studied can affect the riskiness of and 
return to the total crop portfolio and the composition of the crop 
portfolio. Section 4 presents the empirical models. Section 5 describes the 
data. Section 6 presents the results and section 7 sets out the conclusions 
for the study.  
 
2  The Productive Safety Net Programme 
 
The safety net programme of interest in this paper is the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia. It is the largest social protection 
programme in the history of sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of 
South Africa. The annual budget is near US$500 million, and it reaches 
more than 7 million Ethiopians (Gilligan et al. 2008). The programme was Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   5 
 
launched by the government and a number of donors2 in 2005 with the 
aim of combating the persistent problem of food insecurity in Ethiopia. 
The general idea of the programme is to provide food-insecure people 
with public works that will generate a small but secure income. Such 
works differ from region to region, but it aims at generating public goods 
such as roads and stone terraces. The extra income generated from these 
works is intended to ensure that the participants can maintain at least a 
minimum level of consumption, and enable them to keep their productive 
assets in times of income shocks rather than selling them. It should be 
emphasised that the main purpose of the programme is not to affect the 
value, risk or composition of the crop portfolio. Even though such 
impacts are not an explicit programme goal, impacts on the crop portfolio 
will, of course, matter in respect of the programme’s overarching aims and 
deserve to be studied, therefore. 
 
The basic targeting criteria for eligibility to the PSNP are that – 
  the household should have faced continuous food shortages 
during the most recent three years 
  have suddenly become food insecure, and/or 
  lack family support or other means of social protection or 
support. 
 
                                                       
2 Including the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, and several European donors. 6  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
Factors that are mentioned as indicators are –3 
  “status of households’ assets; land holdings, quality of land, food 
stock, etc 
  income from non-agricultural activities and alternative 
employment[, and] 
  support/remittances from relatives or community”. 
 
There are two previous comprehensive studies of effects of the PSNP: 
Gilligan and Hoddinott (2008) and Andersson et al. (2010). Andersson et 
al. (2010) study the effects of the programme on asset holdings. They find 
that the programme increases investment in tree holdings, which are less 
liquid assets, while no effects on livestock holdings are found. Gilligan 
and Hoddinott (2008) study the effect of the programme on a number of 
variables. Of special interest for this study are the variables related to 
agricultural production. They find no significant effect of the PSNP alone 
on the use of improved seed or fertiliser, but report a significant increase 
in the usage of the two inputs when the joint impact of PSNP and other 
food security programmes (where the major part is provision of credit) are 
considered. 
 
Section 3 presents a theoretical framework for how the PSNP can affect 
the composition of the crop portfolio, on the one hand, and the mean and 
variability of the total crop portfolio on the other. 
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3 Theoretical  background 
 
The theoretical framework in this paper is mainly based on the model 
presented by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), but includes some 
minor extensions to fit the current context. The PSNP has two features 
that are important to incorporate in the model. The first is that the 
programme can reduce how much of the variation in profit spills over to 
variation in consumption. This will happen if the programme acts as a 
safety net and ensures that consumption never falls below a level derived 
from the incomes from the programme – even if there is a bad year in 
agricultural production. The implication of this feature is the same as that 
derived by Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), although they consider the 
impact of wealth rather than the impact of participation in a social 
protection programme. The second feature, which represents an extension 
of the original model, is that the programme can affect the availability of 
inputs. It is assumed that the programme can either increase or decrease 
input availability, depending on whether it reduces liquidity constraints 
(which would increase input availability) or competes for labour (which 
would reduce input availability).4 
 
The farmer’s expected utility is assumed to depend on the first two 
moments of consumption, according to – 
 
                                                       
4 In reality there are, of course, a number of additional factors that affect the mean and 
variance of profit, such as input and output price variability. We abstract from this in order 
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    (1) 
 
where   is mean consumption and   is the variation in consumption, 
and where   and  . Consumption is assumed to be derived 
from profits in crop production and income from the PSNP. The 
relationship between consumption and profit is determined in the 
following way: 
 
     (2) 
    (3) 
Here,  and   are the mean and variation in profit. P is participation in 
the PSNP, and is here seen as a continuous variable to simplify the 
analysis. is consumption-derived from the income received from the 
work in the programme.  can be seen as a measure of how much of the 
variation in profit spills over in variation in consumption with  . 
Furthermore, it is assumed that  Ǥ This means that programme 
participation is assumed to act as a buffer and reduce the transmission of 
variation in profit to variation in consumption. The mean and variation in 
profit is assumed to be determined according to the following: 
 
    (4) 
    (5) Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   9 
 
where   is a vector of crop composition, and   is the share 
of land devoted to crop .  is the availability of inputs which is assumed 
to be exogenously determined and depends on programme participation. 
 
To derive the effects of the programme on the crop portfolio we assume, 
for the sake of simplicity, that the expected utility function is additively 
separable in   and  . This implies that the farmers’ expected utility can 
be written as follows: 
 
    (6) 
Again for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two types 
of crops, 1 and 2. The total amount of land is assumed to be fixed and is 
set to unity, so that  . This means that the Lagrange function 






The first-order conditions are given by – 
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From these first-order conditions, it follows that –  
    (9) 
Here,  and   are the marginal contribution from land allocated to crop 
j to the mean and variability of profit, respectively. From equation (9) it 
can be seen that, if crop 1 has a relatively higher return in optimum, i.e. 
, then it also has a relatively high risk, i.e.  . 
Hence, there is a positive relationship between a crop’s marginal 
contribution to the mean profit and its marginal contribution to the 
variability in profit. 
 
The effects of programme participation on the share of land allocated to 
the relatively more profitable and risky crop, , is obtained by total 
differentiation of (8), and the use of Cramer’s rule. This produces –  
 
 
  (10) 
 
The denominator is positive from the second order condition for 
maximisation. Hence, how a change in programme participation will alter 
the amount of land allocated to the more profitable and more risky crop 
will depend on – 
  how the programme affects availability of inputs, which in turn 
affects the marginal profitability and risk of land devoted to each 
crop, and Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   11 
 
  how much the programme reduces the transmission of profit 
variation to consumption variation. 
 
In other words, if the programme only smoothes variation in 
consumption, increased programme participation would lead to an 
increase in the production of high-return, high-risk crops, and would 
thereby increase the average value and risk of the crop portfolio. 
However, programme participation can also alter the composition of the 
crop portfolio by altering the differences in marginal return and risk 
between crops. In this case, the PSNP’s effect on the composition of the 
crop portfolio and on its average return and risk is ambiguous, and is 
likely to depend on the relative input intensities of different crops.  
 
The effects of the PSNP on the mean and risk of the total crop portfolio 
are given by total differentiation of (4) and (5). This gives the following: 
 
 
  (11) 
 
  (12) 
 
The sign of   depends on whether the programme increases 
or decreases the availability of inputs, and the sign of   
depends on whether the resulting changes in inputs are risk-increasing or 
risk-decreasing. The signs of  and   12  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
depend on how the programme alters the composition of the crop 
portfolio. 
 
As can be seen from the brief theoretical exercise above, the overall 
effects of the PSNP on the composition of the crop portfolio and the 
average return and risk in crop production can go in either direction, and 
cannot be determined on theoretical grounds alone. Hence, empirical 
analysis is needed to determine the direction. 
 
4 Empirical  analysis 
 
We use two empirical models to examine how farmers’ crop portfolios 
have changed due to the PSNP. In the first model, we investigate whether 
the programme has altered the value and risk of the crop portfolio. In the 
second model, we investigate whether the programme has brought about 
changes in the land devoted to each crop. The two models are presented 
in detail below. 
 
Before starting the empirical analysis, the inherent problem of evaluation 
studies should briefly be addressed. The problem arises from the fact that 
we can never know what the outcome would have been if the farmers had 
not participated in the programme. One way to approach this lack of 
information is to look at what has happened to farmers who did not 
participate in the programme. When one compares the two groups, it is 
important to control for variables that determine selection into the 
programme and that can, at the same time, affect the outcome; if one does Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   13 
 
not control for these variables, there is a risk that the difference in 
outcome between the groups is not due to programme participation but to 
differences in the characteristics of the households in the two groups. The 
rich data set that we have at hand (described in section 5) allows us to 
control for a wide range of variables such as household characteristics, 
plot characteristics, and input usage. In addition, the programme 
implementation manual is a good guide on what makes a household 
eligible for participation in the programme (see section 2). There is, 
however, still a risk that unobserved variables affect both programme 
participation and the outcome variables. To control for such unobserved 
effects, we make use of the panel data at hand. The panel data methods 
used to solve the problem differ somewhat between the two models, and 
are therefore presented as part of the description of each model. 
 
It can be argued that there is a risk of simultaneity between composition, 
value and risk of the crop portfolio on the one hand, and PSNP 
participation on the other. For example, the farmer who has taken 
considerable risk in his crop portfolio and has suffered large losses in 
output might be more eligible for the programme than one who has not; 
or that households who have only undertaken low-risk, low-yield low 
return activities suffer from food shortages, and it is this that makes them 
eligible. However, this risk of simultaneity is unlikely because most of the 
participants were selected to the programme before the effects on the 
composition, value and risk of the crop portfolio were observed. 
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2.1  Model 1 – Mean and variance of crop yield in the total crop 
portfolio 
 
In order to examine how the PSNP affects the value and risk of the crop 
portfolio, we follow the method suggested by Kumbhakar (1993) and 
specify a production function given by the following: 
 
    (13) 
 
where is the total value of output per hectare produced by household h 
at time ;  is a vector of independent variables including a dummy 
variable indicating programme participation;   and   are parameter 
vectors; and   is a random variable with mean 0 and variance 1. This is 
an adaptation of a model originally attributed to Just and Pope (1978). 
These types of models have frequently been used in agricultural 
economics to study production risks5 and they specifically encompass the 
possibility that an input can be both risk-increasing and risk-decreasing.  
  
Equation (13) can be rewritten to yield the following:  
 
    (14) 
                                                       
5 For later applications and extensions, see e.g. Wan et al. (1992), Kumbhakar (1993), Hurd 
(1994), Traxler et al. (1995), Battese et al. (1997), Tveterås (1999, 2000), Kumbhakar and 
Tsionas (2002), and Di Falco and Chavas (2006). Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   15 
 
This implies that  , and  . 
Hence, by including PSNP participation as an explanatory variable, the 
effects of the PSNP on both the mean value and the variation in this value 
of can be estimated.  Based on a number of tests, as described later, the 
final model considered in this paper is specified as follows (subscripts h 






where  x indicates inputs to production; z indicates other explanatory 
variables, including participation in PSNP; and k , l  and m are indexes 
denoting the different inputs and other explanatory variables. 
 
The model is estimated in two steps. In the first, the mean value function 
is estimated by regressing the logarithm of total value of output on the set 
of explanatory variables (ignoring the variance function). In the second 
step, the variance function is estimated by taking the logarithm of the 
squared residuals from the first step and regressing them on the same set 
of variables. The fact that that the error term is a function of the input 
variables implies that the regression is subject to heteroscedasticity. To 
deal with this problem, the mean function is estimated by weighted least 16  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
squares, where  are used as weights and the variance function is 
estimated with robust standard errors. 
 
To deal with the problem of selection into the PSNP on variables that are 
unobserved but are time-invariant, the production function can be 
estimated with a fixed effect approach (Tveterås, 1999). However, this 
method has the disadvantage that, when the data consist of only two time 
periods, then . This means that the variation in the dependent 
variable in the variance function, which is the natural logarithm of the 
squared residuals, is limited when one uses the fixed effect approach. 
Therefore, we chose to test only if the results in the mean value function 
were different when fixed effect was used, in comparison with using 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The explanatory variables used are 
described in section 5. These include variable inputs used in production, 
plot characteristics, and household characteristics. They are similar to the 
explanatory variables used by Kassie et al. (2008) when yield equations in 
rural Ethiopia were estimated. 
 
2.2  Model 2: Acreage response of different crops 
 
When one estimates the effects of PSNP on the land allocated to different 
crops, a number of issues need to be considered before choosing the 
econometric model. The first issue is that many farmers do not grow all 
the possible crops, which means that the dependent variable is zero for a 
large fraction of the population and continuous for the remaining fraction. 
 Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   17 
 
The second econometric issue, as discussed before, is that there is a risk 
that farmers are selected into the PSNP based on variables that are that 
are not observed (implying that there are unobserved variables that are 
correlated with the independent variables). If farmers that participate in 
the programme differ from those who do not in some aspect that we 
cannot observe, the estimated impact of participation may be biased. 
 
The third econometric issue that arises is that there may be dynamic 
effects in the choice of crops. Dynamic effects can occur if, for example, a 
rotational crop system is used, which would imply that the probability of 
growing a specific crop during one year decreases if the same crop was 
grown during the previous season. Dynamic effects can also occur if there 
is some learning involved in the process which would imply a positive 
correlation between crop choices over the years. 
 
To deal with the first issue, namely the truncated dependent variable, a 
number of different approaches have been suggested. These include the 
Type I Tobit Model (Tobin, 1956; Amemiya 1985), the Type II Tobit 
Model (Amemiya, 1985), and the Two-part Model (Cragg, 1971). The 
Type I Tobit Model has the disadvantage that the same mechanism that 
determines whether or not farmers grow a specific crop is also assumed to 
determine how much land they allocate to that crop. Both the Type II 
Tobit Model and the Two-part Model account for the fact that these 
decisions can actually be two separate mechanisms. The Type II Tobit 
Model, unlike the Two-part Model, accounts for the fact that there can be 
a problem of sample selection in the crop choice, i.e. some unobserved 18  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
variables that affect the decision to grow a specific crop and that are 
correlated with determinants of how much land to allocate to that crop. 
However, the Type II Tobit Model has the disadvantage that it is often 
difficult to identify the parameters in the model. Therefore, we chose to 
use the Two-part Model and test for the existence of sample selection in 
crop choice (which would make the Type II Tobit Model preferable). 
 
The Two-part Model is specified as a lognormal hurdle model (Cragg, 
1971). This means that the decision whether or not to grow a specific 
crop is assumed to be governed by a Probit Model and the land allocated 
to a specific crop (conditional on the crop being grown by the farmer, and 
on a set of explanatory variables) are assumed to follow a lognormal 
distribution. The model can then be written as – 
   
  (16) 
 
where   is the land allocated to crop by household  at time;  is a 
binary variable that is 1 if the crop was planted, and 0 if not; and   is a log 
normally distributed variable measuring the land allocated to that specific 
crop. As we assume that there may be unobserved variables (discussed as 
the second econometrical issue above) and that the probability of growing 
a specific crop may depend on whether or not it was grown during the 
previous season (discussed as the third econometrical issue above), the 
final model is specified as – 






where is a set of explanatory variables;  and   are parameters to be 
estimated;   and   are household-specific, time-invariant, unobserved 
effects; and   and   are error terms that are assumed to be 
independent of each other.   is assumed to follow standard normal 
distribution, and   is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 
and variance  . 
 
To deal with the dynamic structure and unobserved effects that are 
potentially correlated with the independent variable in the first – or probit 
– part of the model, we use a method suggested by Wooldridge (2002). 
We assume that the unobserved effect is a function of the mean value of 
the independent variables and the initial value according to – 
 
    (18) 
where   is the average of   over t;   is the observation of   at time 
zero; and   is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and 
standard deviation  . This implies that 
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The model can now be estimated with the standard random effects probit 
estimation. The intuition behind this method is that the effect of a 
variable is estimated while holding the time average of the variable fixed. 
In the case of the PSNP variable used here, the time-averaged variable 
controls for the fact that it is a specific group of farmers who are 
participating in the programme, while the time-varying variable measures 
the effect of these farmers going from not participating in the programme 
to participating in it. 
 






for two different values of  , and then calculating the difference. 
 
In the second part of the model, time-invariant unobserved effects are 
removed by the standard fixed-effects approach. Since the same variables 
are used for all the individual crops, efficiency could not be gained by 
estimating the equations simultaneously (see e.g. Greene, 2008:257). To 
test for unobserved variables that affect the decision to grow a specific 
crop, and that are correlated with determinants of how much land to 
allocate to that crop, we used a test suggested by Wooldridge (1995). This 
test can be seen as an extension to Heckman’s (1976) test applied to a Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   21 
 
panel data context. The test is conducted by first estimating the inverse 
Mills lambda from the probability of growing a crop in each time period; 
the inverse Mills lambda is then used as an independent variable, after 
which the model is estimated with a fixed-effect estimation on the positive 
sample. 
 
Both parts of the model, i.e. the probability of growing a specific crop and 
the land allocated to that crop, are assumed to depend on both household 
and farm characteristics. This is in line with Benin et al. (2004), who 
studied the economic determinants of crop diversity in the Ethiopian 
highlands. Crop choice is also likely to depend on the inputs available to 
the household. For example, if a household is abundant in family labour, 
it is more likely to plant a labour-intensive crop – especially if the labour 
market is not functioning perfectly. We chose to control for inputs 
employed in production at the household level, as we assume that inputs 
used in crop production are fixed in the short term at the household level, 
but flexible between plots. 
 
Note that input prices are not included in the model, which is typically the 
case in supply functions. This is a limitation in our study and is due to lack 
of data. However, each farmer lives in one of three districts and prices do 
not normally differ much between farmers in the same district; hence, the 
regional dummies can be assumed to capture variation due to different 
prices. 




The data used in this paper were collected through four rounds of 
household surveys. These were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2007 
in 14 sites in East Gojam and South Wollo zones of the Amhara Region 
of Ethiopia. The surveys were performed in collaboration with the 
Departments of Economics at Addis Ababa University, the University of 
Gothenburg, and the World Bank. From these surveys we use data that 
contain information about crop production, input usage, plot 
characteristics, household characteristics, and regional dummies. 
 
The larger household surveys were supplemented by a PSNP survey in 
2008. In this latter survey, the farmers covered in the previous surveys 
were asked about their participation in the PSNP between 2005 – the year 
the PSNP was launched – and 2007. The PSNP survey only covered the 
sites in the South Wollo zone, as these were the only ones from the 
previous surveys that were covered by the PSNP. As the zones differ by 
agricultural conditions, we only make use of the South Wollo sample in 
our analysis.  
 
In all models described above, we use the data from the PSNP survey and 
the 2005 and 2007 household surveys. In the acreage response models we 
also use data from the 1999 and 2002 surveys as lagged dependent 
variables. 
 Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   23 
 
Before the data were used in the analysis, some of the observations were 
removed from the sample. Plots that lacked information about the 
variables of interest and households that reported extreme outliers for one 
or more of the output or input variables used were not included in the 
analysis. The outliers were detected for each variable separately by using 
the test suggested by Hadi (1992, 1994). The original sample comprised 
1,202 observations; after the outliers had been removed, the remaining 
sample consisted of 1,088 observations. The data set does not contain 
specific information about output prices; however, it does contain 
information about revenue from crop sales and quantities sold. By using 
this information, the price for each crop was calculated at the sample 
mean, after extreme outliers had been removed. Some of the crops were 
grown for own consumption only, and were not sold by any farmers in 
the sample; hence, price information for these crops is lacking. This 
problem concerns less than 0.5% of the plots in the final sample. 
Consequently, we only use plots that were planted with a crop that at least 
one farmer in the sample sold during the period. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix A present a description of the crop patterns 
in 2005 and 2007 for the sample used in the analysis. As can be seen in 
Table 1, Cereals was the crop category grown by most farmers, and to 
which most of the land was allocated during both years. The land share 
allocated to cereals was somewhat reduced in 2007. The crop category 
Perennials had the highest production value as well as standard deviation 
during both years, and showed a large increase in the number of growers 
from 2005 to 2007. As can be seen in Table 2, teff was the cereal grown 24  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
by most farmers during both years. Zengada had the highest production 
value per hectare in 2005, while teff had the highest production value in 
2007. 
 
Table 3 in Appendix A describes the dependent variables in the different 
models. The dependent variable in the mean function in Model 1 is the 
value of production per household per hectare for the total crop portfolio. 
This is an aggregated measure of the value of all crops that a household 
produces. As mentioned above, the prices are calculated as the sample 
mean price received for the output sold. The prices are measured in 
nominal terms, but since a time dummy variable is included, inflation will 
not bias the results. As regards teff, the survey asked about three different 
varieties: white, black and mixed. As the three varieties generate different 
prices, the value of teff is the sum of price multiplied by the quantity for 
each of the three varieties. The dependent variable in the acreage response 
models is the land devoted to each crop. 
  
Table 4 in Appendix A describes the independent variables used in the 
analysis. The variables are described for both PSNP participants and non-
participants. The programme’s launch in 2005 means that, by the time the 
last larger household survey was conducted in 2007, the households could 
potentially have participated for three years already: 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
In this paper, PSNP participation is defined as participation during 2006 
and/or 2007. This is in order to make the PSNP variable correspond to 
the household survey data that were collected in May–June 2007, and that 
contain questions concerning production and household status during the Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   25 
 
last year. Although the 2005 survey was conducted during the first year of 
the PSNP, the programme began after farmers had already made their 
planting decisions for that season. For this reason, programme 
participation in 2005 was set to 0 for all households. The rest of the 
independent variables can be classified into three categories: Family 
characteristics,  Farm characteristics and Inputs in production. All variables are 
measured at the household level. The family characteristics are 
straightforward. The dummy variables for farm characteristics (soil quality, 
slope and fertility) are set to 1 if the farm had any plot with the specified 
characteristics. The same applies to the dummy variables used for inputs 
in production, i.e. the dummy variables for manure, improved seeds, 
irrigation, and fertiliser are set to 1 if the household employed that specific 
input on the farm. The Labour variable is defined as the number of man 
days of family labour employed per hectare on the farmer’s own land. 
Traction is defined as the number of days that some means of ploughing 
was used per hectare on the plot.6 The other variables are self-explanatory. 
 
As can be noted, there are many variables that can be important for the 
outcome. This is something that needs to be considered before specifying 
the models. The drawback of including too many variables in the 
empirical analysis is that the variance increases and, hence, there is a risk 
that a variable that actually affects the outcome becomes insignificant. 
However, if variables that are important for the outcome are omitted 
from the model, the estimated parameters will be biased. We therefore 
                                                       
6 Ox, horse, donkey or human labour. 26  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
chose to report the regression results from the full model, including all of 
the variables, as our main results, while the results from models that 




The results from estimations of the mean value and variance functions for 
the entire crop portfolio are presented in Table 5 in Appendix A. The 
results from the mean value function are based on pooled cross-section 
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) estimates of Translog mean value 
functions. This model specification is selected based on two sets of tests. 
Firstly, tests for functional form indicate that the Translog specification is 
preferred to the Cobb-Douglas specification, which in turn is preferred to 
the linear specification. Secondly, tests for unobserved effects indicate no 
significant fixed or random effects.7  The results from the variance 
function are based on a model where the logged squared residuals from 
the mean value function are used as the dependent variable and the 
independent variables are the same as in the mean value function – with 
the exception of squared and cross-product of input variables.8  
 
As can be seen in Table 5 in Appendix A, PSNP is insignificant in both 
the mean value function and in the variance function. This means that 
                                                       
7 An F test where under H0, all time invariant fixed effect = 0 gives F(556, 429) = 1.09 
Prob > F = 0.1745. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
gives chi2(1) = 0.28 Prob > chi2 = 0.5940. 
8 An F test where H0 is that squared inputs and the cross-product of inputs = 0 gives F 
(6,983) = 1.24. Prob > F = 0.2827. Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   27 
 
PSNP participation does not seem to significantly alter the mean value or 
risk in the total crop portfolio, which was one of the main questions of 
this paper. 
 
In order to assess the validity of the model, it is also important to examine 
how other variables affect the mean value and variance. As can be seen, all 
variables that are used either have the signs expected from economic 
theory or are insignificant. In the mean value function, the production 
inputs  Labour and Traction seem to significantly increase the value of 
production. In addition, as can be seen from the significant negative sign 
for squared labour and traction these inputs seem to increase the value of 
production at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, education seems to increase 
the value of production. All of these results are in line with what is 
normally expected from economic theory. The total number of livestock 
owned by the household, which can be seen as an indicator of wealth, also 
seems to significantly increase the value of production. From the time 
dummy variable, we see that the nominal value of production increased 
between the two years in question. There also seems to be a significant 
difference in production value between regions. Black soil seems to 
reduce the mean value of output, while flat land seems to increase it. It is 
also interesting to note that no significant effect from access to credit can 
be seen.9  
 
                                                       
9 Exactly the same parameter estimates are significant when using a stepwise approach, 
where insignificant variables are removed backwards. 28  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
In the variance function, the number of hectares as well as the usage of 
manure seems to reduce the variation in output, while modern fertiliser 
seems to increase the variation.10 These are standard results in the risk 
literature. In general, few variables are significant in the variance function, 
and the R2 for this model is low. 
 
The results from the acreage response models are presented through 
Table 6 to Table 10 in Appendix A. The test for the existence of sample 
selection in crop choice (some unobserved variables that affect the 
decision to grow a specific crop and that are correlated with determinants 
of how much land to allocate to that crop) indicates no such problem for 
any of the crops except pulses.11 Hence, the Two-part Model is considered 
preferable.  
 
The results from the first parts of the acreage response model, the Probit 
Models, are presented in Tables 6 and 7, while the average partial effects 
are presented in Table 8. The results suggest that the PSNP has 
significantly increased the probability of growing perennials and wheat, 
while it has decreased the probability of growing zengada.12 Looking at the 
average partial effects, it can be seen that the effect of PSNP participation 
on the probability of growing perennials is the highest. The results from 
the second part of the acreage response model, i.e. the continuous part 
                                                       
10 ibid. 
11 The tests are available from the author upon request. 
12 For the crops for which PSNP is insignificant, Stepwise Probit Models – where 
insignificant variables are removed backwards – were also tested. The programme effect 
was still insignificant in all cases except for sorghum, where it was significantly negative. Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   29 
 
that is estimated with a standard fixed effect approach, are presented in 
Table 9 and 10. These estimates reveal that the PSNP seems to have 
increased the land allocated to perennials, but reduced the land allocated 




The aim of this paper was to study the effects of a social safety net on the 
mean value and risk in agricultural production. This is an important 
question as it is often believed that a lack of opportunities to manage risk 
ex post traps farmers in low-risk, low-return activities.  
 
In this paper, two questions have been raised: 
  Has the PSNP altered the value and risk in the crop portfolio? 
  Has there been a change in the composition of the crop portfolio 
toward higher-value and higher-risk crops?      
 
The results suggest that the PSNP has brought about some changes in the 
farmers’ choice of farming activities. The largest effect is found on the 
choice to grow perennials, and on the land allocated to them. Perennials 
have longer planning horizons, have a higher value, and have higher 
variability than other crops grown by the farmers in this sample. Hence, 
this result is in line with the findings in previous studies, namely that 
increased possibilities to ex-post smooth consumption in times of 
negative income shocks lead to less income skewing in favour of low-risk, 30  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
low-return activities. The result is also in line with the results in 
Andersson et al. (2010), where it was found that the PSNP had increased 
the plantation of trees. The authors in the latter study conclude that the 
result can be ascribed to the programme giving farmers the option to 
forgo income from annual plants, and instead grow crops that take a 
longer time to mature. Perhaps the same effects are at work in the current 
study. There also seem to be some other minor changes in the probability 
of growing, and land allocated to, different crops that are not as easily 
traced back to any specific risk-return pattern. 
 
No significant result could be found on the mean value and risk in the 
total crop portfolio. This lack of significant result can be explained by the 
programme not having any major influence on variables that are 
important for agricultural production. Another reason might be that there 
are effects that offset each other. In the theoretical model, a number of 
effects are seen to be at work. It is suggested that a change in mean value 
and risk in the crop portfolio could be brought about not only by changes 
in the composition of crop portfolio, but also through changes in the 
availability of inputs. In the empirical analysis, we control for input usage; 
hence, the results are for a given level of input. We cannot control for the 
timing or quality of input, however. The programme can either improve 
the timing of inputs (if it reduces liquidity constraints and makes it easier 
to buy the right inputs at the right time) or worsen the timing of inputs (if 
the farmers are stuck in public work when they are needed the most for 
on-farm work). It can also affect the quality of labour input by providing Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?   31 
 
food during the lean season so that farmers are better fed when the 
sowing season begins.  
 
Notably, the last of the main surveys on which this study was based was 
conducted after the programme had only been in operation for two years; 
hence, it may be too early to say much about the programme’s longer-
term effects. That farmers participating in the PSNP are growing more 
high-value perennials appears not to have had any impact on the overall 
value of their crop portfolios thus far; however, when the plants have had 
time to mature, the impact on the mean value may increase. The results of 
the PSNP that are already starting to show are interesting from a policy 
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Appendix A. Tables 






Average share of land  Average production value 
in Birr per hectare 
Year  2005  2007  2005  2007  2005  2007 
Cereal  531  534  0.81  0.72  2,260  2,791 
      (0.25)  (0.26)  (1,637)  (1,810) 
Perennial  33  266  0.02  0.12  4,131  4,000 
      (0.09)  (0.19)  (2,569)  (5,392) 
Pulses   234  265  0.16  0.14  1,433  2,864 
      (0.23)  (0.19)  (945)  (2,357) 
Other (fruits,  
oilseed, spices) 
44  79  0.01  0.02  1,407  3,710 
    (0.06)  (0.06)  (1,184)  (2,405) 
Note: Standard deviations are within parentheses. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by cereal type 
Cereal  
type 
Number of growing 
households 
Average share of 
cereal land 
Average production value 
in Birr per hectare 
 
Year  2005  2007  2005  2007  2005  2007 
Barley  95  127  0.06  0.07  1571  1751 
      (0.18)  (0.17)  (1217)  (1401) 
Maize  131  142  0.06  0.07  1155  1604 
      (0.16)  (0.17)  (867)  (1515) 
Sorghum  165  178  0.19  0.19  2500  2536 
      (0.32)  (0.31)  (1603)  (1550) 
Teff  380  404  0.37  0.38  2251  3880 
      (0.32)  (0.31)  (1710)  (2666) 
Wheat  151  187  0.14  0.14  2111  2409 
      (0.27)  (0.24)  (1722)  (1701) 
Zengada  149  125  0.15  0.12  3348  3170 




85  88  0.02  0.02  10424  2193 
    (0.07)  (0.07)  (40239)  (1433) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables  
Variables Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Value (in Birr per hectare) of total crop 
portfolio  1088  2184  1379 0  7462 
Land (in hectares) allocated to: 
Cereals  1088  0.652  0.656 0  9.918 
Perennials 1088  0.045  0.107 0  1.236 
Pulses 1088  0.143  0.347 0  8.024 
Other categories  1088  0.017  0.063 0  0.733 
Barley 1088  0.042  0.120 0  2.000 
Maize 1088  0.034  0.120 0  2.000 
Sorghum 1088  0.158  0.330 0  4.000 
Teff 1088  0.263  0.427 0  6.598 
Wheat 1088  0.079  0.165 0  2.199 
Zengada 1088  0.062  0.176 0  3.172 
Other cereals  1088  0.014  0.093 0  2.500 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables  
Variable  Non-participants  Participants 
Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std Dev. 
Household characteristics             
Credit access  683  0.732  0.443  405  0.714  0.453 
Family size  683  6.095  2.305  405  5.825  2.041 
Sex of head of household  676  0.880  0.325  397  0.783  0.412 
Education of head of 
household 
682  1.233  2.755  405  1.274  2.632 
Livestock  683  3.631  2.208  405  2.819  1.793 
Remittance  683  0.141  0.348  405  0.151  0.358 
Corrugated roof  683  0.625  0.484  405  0.383  0.487 
No. of adult males  683  1.849  1.062  405  1.674  0.976 
No. of adult females  683  1.647  0.903  405  1.546  0.771 
Farm characteristics             
Fertile (soil quality)  683  0.763  0.426  405  0.840  0.368 
Infertile (soil quality)  683  0.139  0.346  405  0.121  0.327 
Black (soil colour)  683  0.767  0.423  405  0.778  0.416 
Red (soil colour)  683  0.611  0.488  405  0.657  0.475 
Flat (slope)  683  0.878  0.327  405  0.951  0.217 
Steep (slope)  683  0.287  0.453  405  0.259  0.439 
Inputs in production             
Labour per hectare  683  220.970  318.285  405  250.748  477.987 
Traction per hectare  683  23.841  25.680  405  14.761  17.546 
Manure  683  0.842  0.365  405  0.830  0.376 
Improved seeds  683  0.057  0.232  405  0.074  0.262 
Irrigation  683  0.182  0.386  405  0.099  0.299 
Modern fertiliser  683  0.069  0.253  405  0.074  0.262 
No. of hectares  683  0.811  0.728  405  0.935  0.899 
Region             
Tenta  683  0.174  0.380  405  0.600  0.491 
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 (Table 4 continued)  
Variable 
Non-participants Participants 
Obs.  Mean  Std Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std Dev. 
Theuldere 683  0.531  0.499 405  0.217  0.413 
Time             
Time dummy  683  0.495  0.500 405  0.521  0.500 
Crops grown in 2002             
Cereals  627  0.992  0.089  353  0.989  0.106 
Perennials  627  0.051  0.220  353  0.023  0.149 
Pulses  627  0.278  0.448  353  0.595  0.492 
Other categories  627  0.094  0.292  353  0.198  0.399 
Barley  627  0.150  0.357  353  0.354  0.479 
Maize  627  0.279  0.449  353  0.130  0.337 
Sorghum  627  0.356  0.479  353  0.210  0.408 
Teff  627  0.802  0.399  353  0.819  0.386 
Wheat  627  0.172  0.378  353  0.448  0.498 
Zengada  627  0.408  0.492  353  0.173  0.379 
Other cereals  627  0.091  0.288  353  0.184  0.388 
Crops grown in 1999              
Cereals  643  0.970  0.169  380  0.979  0.144 
Perennials  643  0.005  0.068  380  0.000  0.000 
Pulses  643  0.300  0.459  380  0.521  0.500 
Other categories  643  0.026  0.161  380  0.032  0.175 
Barley  643  0.022  0.146  380  0.079  0.270 
Maize  643  0.079  0.270  380  0.042  0.201 
Sorghum  643  0.123  0.329  380  0.053  0.224 
Teff  643  0.481  0.500  380  0.332  0.471 
Wheat  643  0.059  0.236  380  0.168  0.375 
Zengada  643  0.033  0.178  380  0.016  0.125 
Other cereals  643  0.017  0.130  380  0.047  0.213 40  Can a social safety net affect farmers’ crop portfolios?  
 
Table 5: Pooled WLS estimates of mean value function and pooled OLS 
estimates of the variance function  




PSNP  0.013  -0.023 
  (0.056)  (0.219) 
Family size (ln)  0.025  0.034 
  (0.067)  (0.264) 
Sex of head of household  -0.020  -0.357* 
  (0.063)  (0.211) 
Credit access  0.038  0.159 
  (0.046)  (0.179) 
Education of head of 
household 
0.017**  -0.002 
  (0.008)  (0.029) 
Livestock (TLU)13 (ln)  0.110***  -0.098 
  (0.034)  (0.136) 
Remittance  0.019  -0.031 
  (0.052)  (0.228) 
Corrugated roof  0.039  0.203 
  (0.040)  (0.157) 
No.  of male adults  -0.024  -0.035 
  (0.020)  (0.085) 
No. of female adults  0.008  -0.033 
  (0.024)  (0.103) 
Fertile  0.042  -0.095 
  (0.050)  (0.191) 
Infertile   -0.043  0.240 
  (0.060)  (0.203) 
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(Table 5 continued) 




Black  -0.094**  -0.040 
  (0.045)  (0.188) 
Red  -0.016  0.001 
  (0.041)  (0.179) 
Flat  0.163**  0.223 
  (0.066)  (0.299) 
Steep  -0.004  0.015 
  (0.047)  (0.199) 
Labour (ln)  0.578***  -0.055 
  (0.186)  (0.106) 
Traction (ln)  0.776***  -0.106 
  (0.154)  (0.107) 
No. of hectares (ln)  0.280  -0.237* 
  (0.200)  (0.140) 
Manure  -0.005  -0.517** 
  (0.064)  (0.204) 
Improved seed  -0.115  0.073 
  (0.077)  (0.284) 
Irrigation  -0.059  0.104 
  (0.053)  (0.192) 
Modern fertiliser  0.072  0.535** 
  (0.090)  (0.251) 
Theuldere  -0.290***  0.465** 
  (0.054)  (0.204) 
Tenta  -0.066  0.182 
  (0.063)  (0.268) 
Labour squared (ln)  -0.053***   
  (0.018)   
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(Table 5 continued) 




Traction squared (ln)  -0.093***   
  (0.023)  
No. of hectares (ln) squared   -0.210***  
  (0.032)  
Labour (ln)*Traction (ln)  -0.019   
  (0.028)  
Labour (ln)*Land (ln)  -0.120***   
  (0.038)  
Traction (ln)*Land (ln)  -0.048   
  (0.044)  
Time dummy  0.276***  -0.197 
  (0.053) (0.206) 
Constant 4.568***  -1.676*** 
  (0.500) (0.635) 
Observations14 1016  1016 
R-squared 0.379  0.034 
 Note: The dependent variable in the mean value function is the log value of total 
production (in Birr per hectare). The dependent variable in the variance function is the log 
squared residuals from the predicted mean value function. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. In the variance function, robust standard errors are reported. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 6: Random effects probit estimates by crop category   
Explanatory variables  Perennials  Pulses  Other 
categories 
PSNP 0.895**  -0.122  -0.056 
  (0.350) (0.211)  (0.255) 
Basic controls  yes  yes  yes 
Control for household characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in production  yes  yes  yes 
Control for previous production of crop category  no  yes  yes 
Control for average value of independent variables  yes  yes  yes 
Number of observations15 1073  970  970 
Number of households  576  538  538 
Percentage correctly predicted16 0.800  0.744  0.806 
Log-likelihood value  -410.386  -
442.535  -281.804 
Pseudo R-squared17 0.359  0.369  0.262 
Note: The dependent variable is dichotomous: it is 1 if the specific crop category was 
grown, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and 
regional dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control 
for inputs in production refer to the variables described in Table 4. Control for previous production 
of crop category is the lagged dependent variable (for the observation in 2007, the lagged value 
refers to an observation in 2005; and for the observation in 2005, the lagged value refers to 
an observation in 2002) and the dependent variable in 1999. Control for average value of 
independent variables is the average value for independent variables that have a correlation 
with the independent variable that is less than 0.8. The probability of growing cereal was 
not estimated, as almost all farmers grew some cereal. 
 
                                                       
15 The number of observations differs for perennials and the rest of the crop categories as 
too few households grew perennials in the first period; hence, the model could not be 
estimated when these variables were included. This means that a larger sample could be 
used in these estimations. 
16An observation is calculated as correctly predicted if the dependent variable is 1 and the 
probability of a positive outcome > 0.5 or if the dependent variable is 0 and the probability 
of a positive outcome   0.5. The probability of a positive outcome is calculated assuming 
that the random effect for that observation's panel is 0. 
17 Calculated as (1-log-likelihood function for the full model/log-likelihood function for 
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Table 7: Random effects probit estimates by cereal type   
Explanatory 
variables  Barley  Maize  Sorghum  Teff  Wheat  Zengada  Other 
cereals 
PSNP 
0.257  0.095  -0.326  0.199  0.525*  -0.548*  -0.307 
(0.242)  (0.263)  (0.285)  (0.199)  (0.268)  (0.309)  (0.254) 




yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm 








cereal type  
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Control for 
average value of 
independent 
variables 
yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Number of 
observations  970  970  970  970  970  970  970 
Number of 




0.780  0.730  0.823  0.777  0.781  0.818  0.791 
Log-likelihood 
value  -305  -389  -272  -475  -364  -259  -289 
Pseudo R-
squared19  0.405  0.316  0.519  0.249  0.403  0.503  0.243 
Note: The dependent variable is dichotomous: it is 1 if the specific crop category was 
grown, and 0 otherwise. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and 
regional dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control 
for inputs in production refer to the variables described in Table 4. Control for previous production 
of cereal type includes the lagged dependent variable (for the observation in 2007, the lagged 
value refers to an observation in 2005; and for the observation in 2005, the lagged value refers 
to the observation in 2002) and the dependent variable in 1999. Control for average value of 
independent variables is the average value for independent variables that have a correlation 
with the independent variable that is less than 0.8. 
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Other crop categories  -0.009 
 
 
Table 8b: Average partial effect of PSNP on the probability of growing 
cereal type 










Other cereals types  -0.046 
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Table 9: Fixed effect estimates by crop category   
Explanatory variables  Cereals  Perennials  Pulses 
PSNP 
-0.028 2.926***  -0.315* 
(0.065) (0.865) (0.172) 
Basic controls  yes  yes  yes 
Control for household characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for farm characteristics  yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in production  yes  yes  yes 
Observations 1050  296  494 
Number of hhid  573  271  335 
R-squared 0.911  0.962  0.544 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the area (measured in hectares) planted with 
the specific crop category. Only samples with positive values on the dependent variables 
are used. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and regional 
dummies. Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control for inputs in 
production refer to the variables described in Table 4. There were too few observations to 
estimate the area allocated to other crop categories.  
 
Table 10: Fixed effect estimates by cereal type 
Explanatory variables  Barley  Maize  Sorghum  Teff  Wheat  Zen-
gada 
PSNP 
-0.268 0.384  0.142 -0.166*  -0.045  0.275 
(0.211)  (0.311)  (0.188)  (0.098)  (0.175)  (0.19
3) 
Control for household 
characteristics  yes yes yes yes  yes  -  yes 
Control for farm 
characteristics  yes yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Control for inputs in 
production  yes yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Observations  219 267 338 774  335  270 
Number of hhid  165  195  215  494  231  182 
R-squared 0.525  0.596  0.601 0.595  0.632  0.641 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the area (measured in hectares) planted with 
the specific cereal type. Only samples with positive values for the dependent variables are 
used. All regressions include a constant. Basic controls include time and regional dummies. 
Control for household characteristics, Control for farm characteristics and Control for inputs in production 
refer to the variables described in Table 4. There were too few observations to estimate the 
area allocated to other cereal types.                               IIImpacts of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia on livestock and tree holdings of rural 
households. 
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Microcredit schemes have become a popular means of improving 
smallholders’ access to credit and making long-term investment possible. 
However, it remains to be explored whether the current microcredit 
schemes are more successful than earlier formal small-scale lending in 
identifying successful borrowers. We studied shrimp farming in a rural 
region in Bangladesh where formal microlending is well established, but 
where more expensive informal microlending coexists with the formal 
schemes. Farmers – both those who exclusively use formal loans and 
those who also use informal loans – remain credit-constrained; both types 
overutilise labour in order to reduce the need for working capital. 
However, the credit constraint is actually milder for the informal 
borrowers: the implicit shadow price of working capital is substantially 
higher in the group that only takes formal loans than in the group that 
also uses informal loans. These results suggest that informal lenders – with 
their closer ties to the individual farmers – remain more successful in 
identifying those smallholder farmers that are most likely to use the 
borrowed funds successfully. Informal lenders have an information 
advantage that formal microlenders lack: the latter need to find routes to 
access this information in order for formal microcredit schemes to 
succeed. 
 
Keywords: Microcredit, Adverse selection, Informal credit  
JEL classification: Q12, Q18 
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A study of the effects of opium eradication in the presence of 
imperfect capital markets and sharecropping arrangements 
 
Camilla Andersson,  
Department of Economics, Umeå University,  




In this paper, we model the economic incentives surrounding opium crop 
production at farm level in Afghanistan. Specifically, we examine the 
impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining 
credit, and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. 
The theoretical analysis suggests that when perfect credit markets are 
available, an increased risk of having the opium poppy eradicated will lead 
to less land being allocated to opium poppy. Thus, with perfect credit 
markets, the eradication policy is likely to have the intended effect of 
lowering opium crop production. However, when opium is sold on 
futures markets as a means of obtaining credit, the effects of opium 
eradication are no longer clear-cut: in some cases the outcome may 
actually increase the land allocated to opium poppy. Finally, the results 
indicate that when opium is produced in sharecropping arrangements, 
increased risk of opium eradication will unambiguously make the tenants 
worse off, while landlords may actually benefit. 
 
 
Keywords: Opium, Eradication, Futures markets, Sharecropping 
JEL classification: Q12 
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1 Introduction 
 
Today, Afghanistan is practically the only producer of opium in the world. 
In 2008, Afghanistan accounted for 92% of the world’s opium 
production, and was valued at a third of Afghanistan’s licit gross domestic 
product (GDP) (UNODC, 2008). The high level of production has been 
of international concern not only due to the health problems related to its 
usage, but also due to its contribution to insecurity, instability, and 
corruption, both within and beyond Afghanistan’s borders (Clemens, 
2007). An important part of the counternarcotic strategy to combat the 
production of opium in Afghanistan has been eradication of opium 
poppy. However, eradication of opium poppy is highly controversial. 
Advocates argue that a credible threat of eradication is necessary for 
farmers and landowners to refrain from opium cultivation, while critics 
argue that eradication is inefficient and often even counterproductive 
(Blanchard, 2009). In addition, eradication often targets poor farmers who 
have few alternative sources of income. Indeed, the questionable success 
of eradication strategies calls for a closer examination of the economic 
incentives that are at play at farm level in the Afghan opium industry. Are 
there factors in the market structure surrounding opium crop production 
that affects the outcome of the eradication policies and cause the usual 
assumption of increased risk of eradication – lower levels of crop 
production – to be unfounded? 
 
In this paper, we consider two features that have been associated with 
Afghan opium crop production (Mansfield, 2003): 2 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
  That opium can be used as a means of obtaining credit through 
sales on futures markets, and 
  That the crops often are produced in sharecropping arrangements. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to understand 
whether and, if so, how these circumstances can affect the outcome of 
opium eradication policies. 
 
The reason for studying the effects of eradication under different credit 
and land tenure systems is that the formation of these systems in 
Afghanistan often differs from the perfect credit and land rental markets 
that are usually assumed when evaluating economic policy. In 
Afghanistan, as is often the case in areas where the environment is 
inherently risky and formal credit and insurance markets are limited, 
informal credit systems and sharecropping arrangements have become 
integral parts of the rural economy. In these credit and land rental 
systems, the opium poppy has, due to its favourable characteristics, come 
to play an important role both as a means of obtaining credit through 
sales on futures markets, and as a means to obtain land through 
sharecropping arrangements. It has been widely recognised that these 
roles are likely to influence the choice of what crops to cultivate (see e.g. 
Mansfield, 2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been 
no attempt to launch an in-depth investigation on the underlying 
mechanisms of how and when these circumstances affect the outcome of 
opium eradication.  
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The theoretical analysis presented in this paper suggests that, when perfect 
credit markets are available, an increased risk of having the opium poppy 
eradicated will lead to less land being allocated to opium poppy 
production. Hence, when perfect credit markets are available, the 
eradication policies are likely to have the intended effect. However, if 
opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, the analytical results suggest 
that the outcome of an increased risk of eradication is no longer clear-cut: 
it will depend on how much opium is sold on futures markets and on the 
degree of risk aversion. If the farmers are sufficiently risk-averse and all 
opium poppy crops are sold prior to harvest, the land allocated to these 
crops may actually increase. The analysis also indicates that, when the 
opium poppy is grown in a sharecropping arrangement, the tenant will 
unambiguously suffer losses from increased risk of eradication; on the 
other hand, under some circumstances, the sharecropping landlord may 
actually benefit from increased risk of eradication. These results indicate 
that ignoring the role of opium in the rural market can lead to eradication 
policies having perverse outcomes. 
 
This paper relates to several strands of previous literature. Firstly, it relates 
to models of crime put forward in the seminal work by Becker (1968). In 
these models, crime is seen as an economic decision: a crime is committed 
if the expected utility of committing it outweighs the expected utility of 
using the resources in an alternative activity. Specifically this paper relates 
to the models of crime where the choice of illegal crop production is 
addressed; in this regard the contributions by Ibanez (2007) and Clemens 
(2008) are notable. Ibanez (2007) examines the economic incentives 
surrounding coca production in Colombia. She presents a theoretical 
outline where farmers choose how to allocate land between coca 4 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
production and legal crop production in an environment where there is a 
risk of coca eradication. In her empirical analysis, she finds that the 
decision of whether or not to grow coca can mainly be explained by 
economic incentives, lack of options, poverty, moral considerations, social 
norms, legitimacy, and religious beliefs. Clemens (2008) estimates supply 
and demand elasticities for opium and simulates the equilibrium effects of 
eradication in Afghanistan. He finds that, in order to achieve even modest 
decreases in opium production, substantial increases in opium eradication 
are needed due to low source-country demand elasticities. However, 
neither Ibanez (2007) nor Clemens (2008) take into account that, if the 
illegal crop can be used as a means to obtain credit or is produced in 
sharecropping arrangements, this can affect the outcome of eradication 
policies.  
 
Secondly, this paper relates to the literature on sales of crop production in 
futures markets, where the first formalisation of the problem is presented 
by Stiglitz (1983).  
 
Finally, this paper also relates to the theoretical models of sharecropping 
(see e.g. Singh 2000 for an overview). Of special interest in this regard is 
the contribution by Braverman and Stiglitz (1986) and their result that, in 
a sharecropping arrangement, a landlord may actually benefit from 
resisting technological innovation if the improved technology leads to a 
sufficiently large negative supply response on behalf of the tenant. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is to connect these different strands 
of literature in order to analyse the impacts of eradication policies, given 
the economic and institutional setting facing opium farmers in Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  5 
 
 
Afghanistan. The principal model developed in this paper is a version of 
Becker’s choice between legal and illegal activities, connected with 
Stiglitz’s model of sales of an uncertain output of crops on a futures 
market on the one hand, and Braverman and Stiglitz’s set-up of the 
sharecropping model on the other. Other aspects that influence the choice 
of illegal activities, such as social norms, morality, threats, violence and the 
legitimacy of authorities are left out of the analysis in order to keep the 
model as simple as possible.  
 
In the next section, section 2, the institutional setting is described. The 
focus is on how opium is used as a means of obtaining credit and the 
methods used to eradicate opium in Afghanistan. In section 3, we set up a 
number of theoretical models to study the outcome of opium eradication 
under different credit and land tenure systems. In section 3.1 we 
investigate how an increased risk of eradication affects the land allocated 
to opium poppy crops when perfectly functioning credit markets are 
available. In section 3.2, we investigate how the land allocated to opium 
poppy crops is affected by an increased risk of eradication when opium is 
the only means of obtaining credit. In section 3.3, we investigate how the 
costs and benefits for landlords and tenants, respectively, are affected by 
an increased risk of eradication. The paper ends with a discussion of the 
results of these investigations, and of issues that are left for future 
research. 6 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
2 Institutional  setting
1 
 
Sales of crops on futures markets and the formation of sharecropping 
arrangements are features that are commonly associated with agricultural 
markets worldwide. Sales on futures markets give farmers the opportunity 
to obtain credit and insure against future fluctuations in price, while 
sharecropping arrangements give stakeholders an opportunity to share risk 
and compensate for asymmetric information. In areas like rural 
Afghanistan, where formal credit and insurance are lacking, these kinds of 
credit and land tenure systems are likely to be especially important as a 
means of insuring against risk and smoothing consumption over time. 
 
The opium poppy has, due to a number of specific features, come to play 
an important role in these markets of advance sales and sharecropping 
arrangements. The characteristics that make opium different from many 
other crops are that it – 
  has a high value 
  is light in weight, which makes it easy to transport from remote 
areas 
  is non-perishable, which makes it easy to store 
  is not as sensitive to local pests as many other crops 
  can be grown at high altitudes, and 
  is highly labour-intensive. 
                                                       
1 This section draws heavily on the work of David Mansfield (see e.g. Mansfield, 2003; 
2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007), a leading expert in opium eradication strategies, as well as 
on reports produced by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
the Afghan Research Evaluation Unit. For obvious reasons, few field studies in this area 
have been made and more research is needed in order to have a better picture of the 
market structure surrounding opium crop production in Afghanistan. Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  7 
 
 
The fact that opium is easy to store and transport is likely to make it an 
attractive crop on which advances can be given, as this allows the buyer to 
spread risk between regions and over time. This characteristic is likely to 
be especially attractive, considering that many of the other markets for 
agricultural production in Afghanistan are likely to be shallow, which 
makes the risk for a local supplier of credit on future crop sales extremely 
high. This assumption seems to be confirmed in the field. Mansfield 
(2003) finds that, in opium-growing areas, lenders prefer to give advances 
on opium poppy rather than other crops. The high labour intensity in 
opium cultivation is also likely to make sharecropping an attractive 
arrangement as regards land tenure, as costs associated with monitoring 
wage labour would be high. This is in line with Mansfield (2004), who 
concludes that opium plays an important role as a means for poor farmers 
to gain access to land: sharecroppers who are willing to grow opium are 
given preferential treatment by landlords. 
 
In Afghanistan, agricultural credit known as salaam is usually given 
through a system of advance sales of future harvests. The system is 
essentially that farmers sell their crops prior to harvest, often at a price 
that is significantly lower than the market price. Once the crop is 
harvested, it is delivered to the lenders, who can resell it at a higher price 
on the market. Mansfield (2003) reports that, for many resource-poor 
farmers, advance sales of opium are their only means of obtaining credit 
during the winter season. It is also reported that many of these resource-
poor farmers sell their entire crop prior to harvest in order to cover 
consumption needs and to buy agricultural inputs. The market structure 
surrounding opium-based salaam seems to differ from one geographical 
location to another. A field study of farm-gate opium traders (UNODC, 8 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
1998) found that, in eastern Afghanistan, salaam was usually provided by 
shopkeepers; in the southern regions, salaam was provided by a range of 
different intermediaries in the opium trade. Generally, it seems that the 
opium trade in southern Afghanistan is more open and ‘legitimate’, and is 
characterised by numerous buyers and sellers. In the eastern and central 
provinces of Afghanistan, on the other hand, the opium trade seems to be 
more centralised, with fewer traders (Pain, 2006; UNODC, 1998). 
 
As is always the case with advance sales, there is a risk that the opium is 
never delivered to the lender, e.g. due to crop failures, eradication, or 
moral hazards. To limit the risk of default, salaam has often been found to 
be restricted to farmers that the lenders know (UNODC, 1998). As 
regards the outcome when farmers are unable to deliver the opium, this is 
likely to differ from case to case. Lenders have reported that they either 
permit farmers to delay the delivery of opium until the following season 
(but then demand a higher amount), or they claim the loan amount back 
in cash within the same season (UNODC, 1998). Irrespective of the 
timing of the repayment, farmers have reported that, in order to cope with 
an opium-denominated debt, they use a number of strategies ranging from 
the sale or mortgaging of their land, to the marriage of their daughters 
(Mansfield, 2006b). Opium-denominated debt is often mentioned as a 
driving force behind continued opium cultivation. 
 
However, and of relevance to our modelling, the risk of undelivered 
opium also seems to be reflected in the advance price of opium received 
by the farmers. The dynamics of the price of opium-based salaam and the 
risk of opium poppy eradication can be seen in the patterns discerned 
through a series of field studies known as the Driver Studies (Mansfield, Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  9 
 
 
2003; 2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; 2007). In these studies, farmers’ plans on 
what crops to grow during the season ahead as well as the underlying 
reasons for these plans were examined. In the first Driver Study, a large 
share2 of the respondents had obtained opium-based salaam. In these 
deals, the price for the opium sold in advance was usually set to half the 
current market price. In the second Driver Study, the authors concluded 
that the futures market system seemed to have been put under pressure 
due to a fear of opium poppy eradication. They based this finding on the 
fact that the share of respondents who had taken this kind of credit had 
declined dramatically.3 The authors also reported that the advance price 
had fallen to 30–40% of the prevailing market price for those farmers who 
owned no land and, therefore, had been considered less creditworthy.4 
 
In respect of the eradication strategies themselves, their content in 
Afghanistan has varied over the years. The current programme was 
launched in 2004 and is based on forced eradication. Today, all opium 
eradication in the country is led by the Central Poppy Eradication Force 
(CPEF) and the Afghan National Police (AP). The methods used are 
mainly destruction by tractor, stick, animal plough, or all-terrain vehicles 
(UNODC, 2009)5. Thus, unlike the eradication policies pursued against 
coca farming in parts of Latin America, for example, the eradication of 
                                                       
2 Ranging from 63% in Nangahar to 16% in Badakhshan. 
3 Only 5% of the respondents in the total sample. 
4 For a comprehensive review of the literature and the linkages between opium and 
informal credit, see Pain (2008). 
5 At the international level, counternarcotic supply control strategies in source countries 
fall into four broad categories: eradication, alternative development, in-country 
enforcement, and interdiction. Alternative development refers to development of new 
alternative income sources that are financially attractive for the farmer. In-country enforcement 
targets refineries, stocks and business dealings. Finally, interdiction targets international 
trafficking and smuggling operations (Paoli et al., 2009). 10 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
opium will only affect the opium crop per se and will not affect other 
crops grown on nearby land.  This factor simplifies our subsequent 
modelling considerably. 
 
3 Theoretical  models 
 
In the following subsections, we investigate the effects of the eradication 
policy under different credit and land tenure systems in a number of 
theoretical models. In section 3.1, the effects of an increased risk of 
opium eradication on farmers’ crop choices is examined in a situation 
when credit markets are perfectly available and the farmer can freely 
decide how to allocate land to different crops. Section 3.2 presents an 
analysis of whether these effects are altered when the only way to obtain 
credit is through sales of opium on a futures market through the salaam 
system. Section 3.3 presents an investigation into how an eradication 
strategy affects landowners’ profits and utility for tenants when opium is 
produced in a sharecropping arrangement. 
 
3.1  Baseline: Perfect capital markets and rented land 
 
Assume that a farmer derives utility from consumption in two time 
periods according to the following: 
 
    (1) 
 
where   is consumption in time period i = 1, 2, and   is a discount factor. 
It also assumed that the farmer can produce two goods: opium and 
another agricultural good. The only factor of crop production is land, L, Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  11 
 
 
which is fixed,6 but it can be allocated freely to production of the two 
goods. The rental cost of land is given by the price . The production 
functions for opium and the other agricultural good can then respectively 
be written as   and  Ǥ  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the farmers face a risk that the opium 
crop production will be eradicated. Hence, the actual outcome of the such 
production is given as  ǡ where  with probability  , and 
with probability . The price of opium is given by   and the price of 
the other agricultural good is normalised to 1. The production and 
consumption decisions are assumed to be made at the beginning of the 
first period, and production realised in the second period. In the first 
period, the farmer can borrow at the interest rate r. Assuming that s/he 
borrows  , consumption in the second period is then given as follows: 
 
    (2) 
 
Hence, the farmer is assumed to choose how to allocate land between the 
two activities and consumption between the time periods in order to 






                                                       
6 Owing to the fractured character of the Afghan countryside, with small plots of arable 
soil surrounded by rocky, untillable land, in practice the sizes of plots are often fixed by 
natural factors. 12 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
where U is the utility of consumption. It is also assumed that the utility 
function is concave, meaning that   and    The 
utility in the second period differs according to good or bad outcomes. To 
distinguish between the different outcomes, we denote 
ǡ i.e. the utility from second-period consumption 
when the opium has not been eradicated, and 
, i.e. the utility from second-period consumption when the 
opium has been eradicated. As the income is larger in the former case, it 
follows that   
 





  Ͳ  (5) 
 
Equation (4) implies that, in optimum, the marginal utility of consumption 
in the first period is equal to the mean of the expected utility across the 
different states in the second period, weighted by the interest rate and the 
discount rate. This is an expected result, but it is mentioned here as it will 
be used as a point of reference in future models. Equation (5) can be 
reorganised to yield the following: 
 
    (6) 
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This implies that, in optimum, because of farmers’ risk aversion, the 
expected marginal revenue product of land is always higher for opium 
poppy than for the other agricultural good. To derive the effect of an 
increased risk of eradication, we totally differentiate the first-order 
conditions and use Cramer’s rule (for a more detailed description of the 






where   is the Hessian determinant, which is positive from the second 
order conditions for maximisation. The signs of the numerators in the 
first and second terms are both negative. Hence, if the system has an 
interior solution, then  . 
 
Thus, if a risk-averse farmer chooses how to allocate land between opium 
poppy and another agricultural good, and perfect credit markets are 
available, an increased risk of eradication will unambiguously reduce the 
land allocated to opium poppy. This result is intuitive and in line with 
expectations. Hence, under perfectly functioning credit markets, 
eradication is likely to have the intended effects of reducing or even 
eliminating opium poppy production. An important thing to note here is 
that, as it is assumed that all opium is lost in the case of eradication, there 
is no reason for the farmer to a priori increase the production of opium 
poppy crops to compensate for income losses in the bad state in the case 14 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
of an increased risk of eradication. We now turn to the case when credit is 
obtained through advanced sales of opium. 
 
3.2 Imperfect  capital  markets  and  rented  land 
 
In this subsection, we model a situation where there are no formal credit 
markets available to the farmer, and the only way to obtain credit is 
through sales of opium on a futures market. Throughout this section, a 
number of assumptions need to be made about the lender and the market 
in which s/he operates. In this paper we assume, for simplicity, that the 
lender is risk-neutral and operates in a fully competitive market. 
 
We also need to make assumptions about what happens if the opium 
poppy is eradicated before it is delivered to the lender. In this case, there 
are at least three possible ways to make the market clear in a two-period 
setting. The first option is that the borrower always pays back the 
borrowed amount to the lender. Given the above assumptions, this would 
imply that lenders face no increased risk due to eradication, and the 
advance price of opium differs from the harvest price only by the interest 
rate. This scenario leads us to the baseline model described above. The 
second option is to assume that, if eradication occurs, there is no way for 
the lender to get the borrowed money back. If this risk is anticipated by 
the lender at the time of providing the loan, the risk of eradication will be 
fully reflected in the advance price received on the opium. This would 
imply that the farmer ‘pays’ for the eradication through the lower advance 
price. The third option is a mixed case: the farmer pays back as much as 
possible in the second period, but this is not sufficient to repay the full Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  15 
 
 
loan. In this case scenario, the risk of eradication will also be partly 
reflected in the opium’s advance price. 
 
In the models presented below, we follow the second option and assume 
that the risk of eradication is fully reflected in the advance price. 
 
Now let us turn to the formulation of the lender’s optimisation problem. 
We assume that, in the first period, i.e. prior to harvest, the farmer has the 
opportunity to sell opium to a lender at the price   In the second period, 
the opium can be sold at a fixed price . This price is assumed to be set 
on a world market that is sufficiently large not to be influenced by the risk 
of eradication; for simplicity’s sake, this price is assumed to be non-
stochastic. As it is assumed that the lender operates on a fully competitive 
market, the expected present value of the lender’s profit is 0, and there is 
no way for the lender to reclaim his money in case of opium poppy 
eradication, the lender’s expected profit can be written as follows: 
 
    (8) 
 
where   is the opium bought by the lender. A rearrangement of 
equation (8) gives: 
 
    (9) 
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Equation (9) implies that if the risk of eradication,  increases, the price 
of opium in the first period decreases. This result is in line with the 
findings in Mansfield (2004).  
 
The model presented above could be seen as special case of a broader 
model where the lender has a limited amount of liquid assets to use on 
purchases of futures on different kinds of agricultural production. The 
special case would then occur when the profitability in advance purchases 
of opium is higher for every unit of opium bought in advance, compared 
with advance purchases of other crops. 
 
Now let us turn to the farmer’s optimisation problem. Assume that the 
farmer sells   units of opium in advance to buy   units of the other 
agricultural good. This means that the budget constraint in the first period 
is given by the following: 
 
    (10) 
 
In the second period, there are two possible outcomes for the farmer. If 
no eradication occurs, s/he can consume what s/he receives for the 
remaining opium crop production and the production of the other 
agricultural good, minus the land rental cost, expressed as follows: 
 
    (11) 
 
By inserting (9) and (10) into (11), the above expression can be rewritten 




    (12) 
 
In the second possible outcome for the farmer, namely if eradication 
occurs, the second-period consumption is given by the following: 
 
  (13) 
 






w.r.t.   and  .  
 
It should be noted that, as long as  , the farmer is 
overcommitted, in the sense that s/he sells more than the expected 
output. We assume that there is a limit for overcommitment, in that the 
farmer can never sell more of his opium poppy crop than he plants. This 
can be thought of as a situation where the lender and the farmer operate 
in the same village, so there is no option to sell more opium in advance 
than what is actually planted. The overcommitment constraint implies that 
the following inequality must then hold: 
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    (15) 
 
The solution to the model will differ depending on whether or not the 
overcommitment constraint is binding. In Case 1 (see 3.2.1 below), we 
look at the model when the constraint is binding; in Case 2 (see 3.2.2 
below), we look at the model when the constraint is not binding. We end 
this subsection with Case 3 (see 3.2.3 below), where it is assumed that the 
first-period consumption is restricted to a minimum level of consumption 
and, therefore, is totally inelastic. 
 
3.2.1 Case  1 
 
In Case 1, the entire opium crop produced is sold in advance. As 
mentioned in section 2, previous field studies have found that many 
Afghan farmers sell their entire opium crop prior to harvest in order to 
meet their consumption needs during the winter months. Hence, for some 
farmers, the assumption of an advanced sale of all opium crops seems 
reasonable.  
 
In this case, an increased risk of eradication only enters the utility function 
through the advance price, since all of the opium is already sold when the 
potential eradication occurs; hence, there is no stochasticity in the utility 
function. The utility function can be written as follows: 
 
    (16) 
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which is maximised w.r.t.  . The first-order condition can then be written 
as follows: 
    (17) 
 
From equation (17), it follows that the marginal rate of substitution of 
consumption in the two time periods,  , is equal to the marginal rate of 
technical transformation in the production of the two crops,  , weighted 
by the relative price of consumption in each time period,  . Total 
differentiation of equation (17) gives the following: 
 
 








    (19) 
 
The denominator in equation (19) is negative from the second-order 
condition for maximisation. The numerator can be rewritten as: 
, where  , can be seen as a measure of relative risk 20 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
aversion. Thus, the sign of equation (19) will depend on the degree of risk 
aversion. 
 
Proposition 1: If a risk-averse farmer sells his entire opium crop in 
advance on a competitive market where the lenders fully anticipate that 
some of the crop production will be eradicated, the effect of an increased 
eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Thus, –  
  if R  , increased risk of eradication will lead to a reduction in the 
land allocated to opium poppy. 
  if R , increased risk of eradication will lead to an increase in the 
land allocated to opium poppy.  
 
Thus, in optimum, there are basically two contradicting forces at play 
when the risk of eradication increases and the advance price of opium 
declines. One direct effect works in the direction of lowered opium poppy 
production. This can be seen as a substitution effect, where the reduced 
profitability of opium crop production draws resources away from such 
production. There is also an indirect effect that works in the direction of 
increased production. This can be seen as an income effect that stems 
from the fact that, to maintain the same level of consumption in the first 
period, more resources need to be allocated to opium crop production. 
The net outcome of these two effects will depend on the degree of the 
farmer’s risk aversion. If the farmer’s risk aversion is low, the optimal 
response is to reduce the amount of land allocated to opium crops; if the 
degree of risk aversion is sufficiently high, the farmer will insure 
himself/herself against income losses by increasing the production of 
opium. This is interesting: it implies that the more risk-averse the farmer Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  21 
 
 
is, the more likely s/he is to act contrary to policymakers’ intentions when 
the risk of eradication increases. 
 
3.2.2 Case  2 
 
In Case 2, the farmer keeps some of the opium to be sold after harvest at 
the price that is higher than the advance price. This implies that the 
expected utility function is given by equation (14). This situation can be 
seen as a combination of the two previous models described above: the 
opium that is kept for sale after harvest is directly subject to the risk of 
eradication, and the opium that is sold in advance is only affected by 
eradication through the price effect. The first-order conditions in this 
model are given by the following: 
 
 
  (20) 
 
 
  (21) 
 
Note that the difference between equation (20) and equation (4) is that the 
trade-off in consumption is now only between the first period and the 
‘good’ outcome in the second period.  
 
Total differentiation and Cramer’s rule (see Appendix B for details) give 
the following: 





Here, R is defined as   and can again be seen as a measure of 
relative risk aversion. As before,   is the Hessian determinant, which is 
positive from the second-order conditions for maximisation. The 
numerator second term is negative, while the numerator in the first term 
will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Hence, if the farmer’s risk 
aversion is low, increased eradication will lead to lower levels of opium 
crop production; if the risk aversion is sufficiently high, the effect is 
ambiguous. 
 
Proposition 2: If a risk-averse farmer sells some of the produced opium 
in advance on a competitive market where the lenders fully anticipate that 
some of the crop production will be eradicated, the effect of an increased 
eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. Thus, – 
  if  , increased risk of eradication will lead to a reduction in 
the land allocated to opium poppy. 
  if  , the effect of increased risk of eradication on land 
allocated to opium poppy production is ambiguous. 
 
Thus, when some opium is kept for sales after harvest, the outcome is 
similar to that when all opium is sold in advance. The outcome in Case 2 
differs from Case 1 only in respect of the indeterminate outcome in the Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  23 
 
 
event of high risk aversion. As the opium that is kept for selling after the 
harvest is directly subject to the risk, it is not surprising that the 
substitution effect is relatively stronger in Case 2. 
 
3.2.3 Case  3 
 
We now turn to the special case when first-period consumption is totally 
inelastic. This could be thought of as a situation where the farmer is at 
borderline starvation levels of consumption in the first period, and only 
produces the amount of opium necessary to meet this consumption level. 







where   is the minimum level of necessary consumption. 
 
Total differentiation then gives the following: 
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Proposition 3: If the farmer’s first-period consumption is restricted by a 
minimum subsistence level, an increased risk of eradication will lead to an 
increase in the land allocated to opium crop production.  
 
The intuition behind this result is that if the price of opium goes down 
and the farmer cannot reduce his consumption further, s/he has no 
choice but to grow more opium. This result is reasonable as long as the 
risk of eradication is sufficiently low; if the risk of eradication is 
sufficiently high, however, lenders are likely to provide advances on other 
crops instead. 
 
3.3  Imperfect capital markets and sharecropping 
arrangements  
 
We now shift focus and study the effects of eradication when opium is 
produced in a sharecropping arrangement. Instead of paying a land rental 
cost, the tenant shares the agricultural output with the landlord. In section 
3.3.1, we study a situation where the tenant decides what share of the land 
to allocate to opium poppy crops and another agricultural product. In 
section 3.3.2, we study a situation where the landlord has already decided 
that opium will be grown on a specific plot. These can be seen as extreme 
cases. In reality, the decisions on which crops to grow, and what shares to 
allocate to these crops, are likely to be determined through negotiations.   
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3.3.1   Tenant decides land allocation 
 
In this section we use the same models as described in sections 3.2.1 and 
3.2.2, but assume that instead of a land rental cost, the output share 
received by the tenant is denoted by   and the output share received by 
the landlord is denoted by ǤFor simplicity, we assume that the 
shares are exogenous and set by cultural norms or tradition. The tenant’s 






As long as the shares received from opium and the other agricultural 
product are the same, the optimal solution as well as the effect of 
eradication on land allocated to opium poppy production are analogous to 
those in the models described above. Note that, in optimum, the change 
in the tenant’s utility caused by a change in the risk of eradication is given 





As the income is always larger in the no-eradication outcome, it follows 
that  . Thus, the expected utility of the tenant will always decrease 
when the risk of eradication increases. 
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But what outcome can the landlord expect? The landlord is assumed to 
maximise the expected profit rather than the expected utility. The present 














The first term in equation (29) is negative, while the second is 
indeterminate.7 Hence, the effect on the landlords profit from an 
increased risk of eradication is ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 4: Given the assumptions made in section 3.3.1, an increased 
risk of opium poppy eradication will always lead to lower expected utility 
for the tenant. However, the effect of increased risk of eradication on the 
landlord’s expected profit is ambiguous. 
                                                       
7 In model 3.2.1,   is either positive or negative depending on the tenant’s degree 
of risk aversion while the sign of    is ambiguous, which can be seen 
from equation (17) when reorganised to yield . In model 3.2.2, 
 is either negative or indeterminate depending on the tenant’s degree of risk 
aversion while the sign of    is positive, which can be seen from 
equation (21) when reorganised to yield . Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  27 
 
 
3.3.2  Cultivation of opium poppy decided in advance 
 
In this model, we assume that the landlord has already decided that only 
opium poppy crops should be grown on a specific plot. For simplicity’s 
sake, we assume that the tenant sells his/her entire share in advance, while 
the landlord’s share is sold after the harvest. We also assume that the only 
thing that the tenant can choose in this model is how much effort, e, to 
put into production. This is in order to have some choice variable for the 
tenant; otherwise, the problem would become trivial. The income received 





where   and  . Assuming that the utility function is additively 





where  is the utility of consumption and   is the disutility of effort. 
It is assume that  ,  ,   and  .  The first-order 
condition can then be written as follows: 
 
  ൌͲ (32) 
  











where   is a measure of the relative risk aversion. Hence, the 
effect of eradication will depend on the degree of risk aversion. If R > 1, 
an increased risk of opium poppy eradication leads to more effort being 
directed towards opium poppy production. Note, again, that increased 









 Counterproductive counternarcotic strategies?  29 
 
 
while the change in profit from an increased risk of opium poppy 





Hence, again, the effect of an increased risk of eradication on the 
landlords profit is ambiguous. If an increased risk of opium eradication 
leads to an increased effort by the tenant, and the effort response is 
sufficient to offset the lower expected output, the landlord may actually 
benefit from increased eradication. If this is the case, the increased risk of 
eradication creates no incentive for the landlord to switch production to 
other agricultural crops in subsequent periods. 
 
Proposition 5: Given the assumptions made in section 3.3.2, an increased 
risk of opium poppy eradication will always lead to lower expected utility 
for the tenant. However, the effect of increased risk of eradication on the 
landlord’s expected profit is ambiguous and will depend on the tenant’s 
degree of risk aversion. For low levels of risk aversion, the landlord will 
lose; but if the tenant is sufficiently risk-averse, the landlord may actually 




The eradication of opium poppy is highly controversial. Critics argue that 
the effect is limited and the human costs are high, while advocates argue 
that eradication is an important instrument for reducing opium poppy 
cultivation. To offer some insight into this debate, this paper investigated 30 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
how the role of opium in the rural economy affects the outcome of 
eradication policies. As this paper is the first attempt to model the opium 
farmer’s decision problem, we have used quite simple assumptions 
throughout. For example, we have assumed risk-neutral lenders who 
operate in a fully competitive market. The realism in this assumption can 
be questioned; future research should explore if the results change if 
lenders are assumed to be risk-averse, or if the lending market is assumed 
to be less than perfectly competitive. However, despite the simplicity of 
the model, it still gives some important insights into the underlying 
mechanisms at stake. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that, when perfect credit 
markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to lower 
levels of opium poppy production. Hence, if credit markets were available, 
the eradication strategy would be likely to have the intended effect of 
lowering production. However, the assumption of perfect credit markets 
is likely to be unrealistic in rural Afghanistan. In this paper, we try to build 
a model that incorporates some of the aspects of Afghanistan’s credit 
market and, especially, the role of opium in this context. A number of 
field studies have found that, in opium poppy crop-growing areas in 
Afghanistan, cultivation has become an important way to obtain credit; 
for poor farmers, it is even sometimes the only way. It has also been 
found that many of the farmers sell their entire crop production prior to 
harvest to obtain credit for covering consumption needs during the winter 
season. The price received from these advance sales of opium seems to 
reflect the risk of eradication: the higher the risk of eradication, the lower 
the price that the farmer obtains on the advance sale. 
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When these aspects are taken into consideration, the results of this study 
indicate that the outcome of eradication policies are no longer clear-cut, 
but will depend on the degree of risk aversion. The higher the degree of 
risk aversion and the more opium that is sold in advance, the more likely it 
is that the eradication is counterproductive. This is something that is 
worth reflecting on when future counternarcotic strategies are designed. 
 
Another aspect of Afghanistan’s rural market is that of sharecropping 
arrangements. The results from this study suggest that, if the tenants’ 
effort response is sufficiently large, the landlord may actually benefit from 
an increased risk of eradiation and thus, the landlord will have no interest 
in reduced opium poppy production. If this is the case, and landlords are 
influential in the villages, the scope of reducing opium by eradication is 
limited.  
 
Eradication policies would be straightforward and have the intended 
effects on farmers’ incentives if credit markets and land markets 
functioned perfectly. If we remember that such perfection is not realistic, 
even our simple models indicate that the outcomes from eradication are 
difficult to predict.  
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Total differentiation of the first-order condition described in (4) and (5) 
gives the following expression: 
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To understand how an increased risk of eradication, , affects the land 




where the determinant is positive from the second-order conditions for 





Total differentiation of the first-order condition described in (14) and (15) 




















 38 Counterproductive  counternarcotic strategies? 
The use of Cramer’s rule gives the following: 
 
 
 Avhandlingar framlagda vid Institutionen för nationalekonomi, 
Umeå universitet 
 




Holmström, Leif (1972) Teorin för företagens lokaliseringsval. UES 1. PhLic 
thesis 
Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf (1972) Studier i teorin för prisdiskriminering. UES 2. PhLic 
thesis 
Dahlberg, Åke (1972) Arbetsmarknadsutbildning - verkningar för den enskilde 
och samhället. UES 3. PhD thesis 
Stage, Jørn (1973) Verklighetsuppfattning och ekonomisk teori. UES 4. PhLic 
thesis 
Holmlund, Bertil (1976) Arbetslöshet och lönebildning - kvantitativa studier av 
svensk arbetsmarknad. UES 25. PhD thesis 
Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf (1977) En studie i neokeynesiansk arbetslöshets- och 
inflationsteori. UES 34. PhD thesis 
Lundberg, Lars (1976) Handelshinder och handelspolitik - Studier av verkningar 
på svensk ekonomi. Industriens Utredningsinstitut, Stockholm. PhD thesis 
Johansson, Per-Olof (1978) Sysselsättning och samhällsekonomi - En studie av 
Algots etablering i Västerbotten. UES 53. PhD thesis 
Wibe, Sören (1980) Teknik och aggregering i produktionsteorin. Svensk 
järnhantering 1850-1975; en branschanalys. UES 63. PhD thesis 
Ivarson, Lars (1980) Bankers portföljvalsbeteende. En teoretisk studie. UES 64. 
PhD thesis 
Batten, David (1981) Entropy, Information Theory and Spatial Input-output 
Analysis. UES 92. PhD thesis Hårsman, Björn (1982) Housing Demand Models and Housing Market Models for 
Regional and Local Planning. Swedish Council for Building Research, 
D13:1981. PhD thesis 
Holm, Magnus (1983) Regionalekonomiska modeller för planering och 
samordning i en decentraliserad ekonomi. Byggforskningsrådet, R118:1981 
and R5:1983. PhD thesis 
Ohlsson, Henry (1986) Cost-Benefit Analysis of Labor Market Programs - 
Applied to a Temporary Program in Northern Sweden. UES 167. PhLic 
thesis 
Sarafoglou, Nikias (1987) A Contribution to Population Dynamics in Space. UES 
179. PhD thesis 
Ohlsson, Henry (1988) Cost-Benefit Analysis of Labor Market Programs - 
Applied to a Temporary Program in Northern Sweden. UES 182. PhD thesis 
Anderstig, Christer (1988) Applied Methods for Analysis of Economic Structure 
and Change. CERUM 1988:2, Umeå University. PhD thesis 
Karlsson, Charlie (1988) Innovation Adoption and a Product Life Cycle. UES 185. 
PhD thesis 
Löfström, Åsa (1989) Diskriminering på svensk arbetsmarknad - En analys av 
löneskillnader mellan kvinnor och män. UES 196. PhD thesis 
Axelsson, Roger (1989) Svensk arbetsmarknadsutbildning - En kvantitativ analys 
av dess effekter. UES 197. PhD thesis 
Zhang, Wei-Bin (1989) Theory of Economic Development - Nonlinearity, 
Instability and Non-equilibrium. UES 198. PhD thesis 
Hansson, Pär (1989) Intra-Industry Trade: Measurements, Determinants and 
Growth - A study of Swedish Foreign Trade. UES 205. PhD thesis 
Kriström, Bengt (1990) Valuing Environmental Benefits Using the Contingent 
Valuation Method: An Econometric Analysis. UES 219. PhD thesis 
Aronsson, Thomas (1990) The Short-Run Supply of Roundwood under Nonlinear 
Income Taxation - Theory, Estimation Methods and Empirical Results 
Based on Swedish Data. UES 220. PhD thesis Westin, Lars (1990) Vintage Models of Spatial Structural Change. UES 227. PhD 
thesis 
Wikström, Magnus (1992) Four Papers on Wage Formation in a Unionized 
Economy. UES 287. PhD thesis 
Westerlund, Olle (1993) Internal Migration in Sweden - The Role of Fiscal 
Variables and Labor Market Conditions. UES 293. PhLic thesis 
Bergman, Mats A. (1993) Market Structure and Market Power. The Case of the 
Swedish Forest Sector. UES 296. PhD thesis 
Johansson, Per (1993) Count Data Models - Estimator Performance and 
Applications. UES 315. PhD thesis 
Roson, Roberto (1994) Transport Networks and the Spatial Economy - A General 
Equilibrium Analysis. UES 340. PhD thesis 
Li, Chuan-Zhong (1994) Welfare Evaluations in Contingent Valuation - An 
Econometric Analysis. UES 341. PhD thesis 
Østbye, Stein (1994) Regional Labour and Capital Subsidies - Theory and 
Evidence of the Impact on Employment under Wage Bargaining. UES 344. 
PhLic thesis 
Westerlund, Olle (1995) Economic Influences on Migration in Sweden. UES 379. 
PhD thesis 
Mortazavi, Reza (1995) Three Papers on the Economics of Recreation, Tourism 
and Property Rights. UES 396. PhLic thesis 
Østbye, Stein (1995) Regional Labour and Capital Subsidies. UES 397. PhD 
thesis 
Hussain-Shahid, Imdad (1996) Benefits of Transport Infrastructure Investments: 
A Spatial Computable General Equilibrium Approach. UES 409. PhD thesis 
Eriksson, Maria (1996) Selektion till arbetsmarknadsutbildning. UES 410. PhLic 
thesis 
Karlsson, Niklas (1996) Testing and Estimation in Labour Supply and Duration 
Models. UES 413. PhD thesis Olsson, Christina (1996) Chernobyl Effects and Dental Insurance. UES 428. 
PhLic thesis 
Vredin, Maria (1997) The African Elephant - Existence Value and Determinants 
of Willingness to Pay. UES 441. PhLic thesis 
Eriksson, Maria (1997) To Choose or not to Choose: Choice and Choice Set 
Models. UES 443. PhD thesis  
Widerstedt, Barbro (1997) Employer Change and Migration. Two Papers on 
Labour Mobility in Sweden. UES 444. PhLic thesis 
Lundberg, Sofia (1997) The Economics of Child Auctions in 19th Century 
Sweden. UES 445. PhLic thesis 
Lundberg, Johan (1997) Two Papers on Revenue and Expenditure Decisions in 
the Swedish Local Public Sector. UES 454. PhLic thesis 
Widerstedt, Barbro (1998) Moving or Staying? Job Mobility as a Sorting Process. 
UES 464. PhD thesis 
Bask, Mikael (1998) Essays on Exchange Rates: Deterministic Chaos and 
Technical Analysis. UES 465. PhD thesis 
Löfgren, Curt (1998) Time to Study Students: Two Essays on Student 
Achievement and Study Effort. UES 466. PhLic thesis 
Sjögren, Tomas (1998) Union Wage Setting in a Dynamic Economy. UES 480. 
PhD thesis 
Mortazavi, Reza (1999) Essays on Economic Problems in Recreation, Tourism 
and Transportation. UES 483. PhD thesis 
Rudholm, Niklas (1999) Two Essays on Generic Competition in the Swedish 
Pharmaceuticals Market. UES 485. PhLic thesis 
Olsson, Christina (1999) Essays in the Economics of Dental Insurance and Dental 
Health. UES 494. PhD thesis 
Marklund, Per-Olov (1999) Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency. UES 
504. PhLic thesis 
Berglund, Elisabet (1999) Regional Entry and Exit of Firms. UES 506. PhD thesis Hellström, Jörgen (1999) Count Data Autoregression Modelling. UES 507. PhLic 
thesis 
Nordström, Jonas (1999) Tourism and Travel: Accounts, Demand and Forecasts. 
UES 509. PhD thesis 
Johansson Vredin, Maria (1999) Economics Without Markets. Four papers on the 
Contingent Valuation and Stated Preference Methods. UES 517. PhD thesis 
Schei, Torbjørn (2000) Natural recreation resources: production and a diversity of 
interests related to the management of grouse as an outfield resource in 
Finnmark, Norway, in the Euro-Arctic Barents region. UES 523. PhLic 
thesis 
Backlund, Kenneth (2000) Welfare Measurement, Externalities and Pigouvian 
Taxation in Dynamic Economies. UES 527. PhD thesis 
Andersson, Linda (2000) Job Turnover, Productivity and International Trade. 
UES 530. PhLic thesis 
Ylvinger, Svante (2000) Essays on Production Performance Assessment. UES 
531. PhD thesis 
Bergkvist, Erik (2001) Freight Transportation. Valuation of Time and Forecasting 
of Flows. UES 549. PhD thesis 
Rudholm, Niklas (2001) The Swedish Pharmaceuticals Market - Essays on Entry, 
Competition and Antibiotic Resistance. UES 552. PhD thesis 
Lundberg, Johan (2001) Local Government Expenditures and Regional Growth in 
Sweden. UES 554. PhD thesis 
Lundberg, Sofia (2001) Going Once, Going Twice, SOLD! The Economics of 
Past and Present Public Procurement in Sweden. UES 557. PhD thesis 
Eliasson, Kent (2001) University Enrollment and Geographical Mobility: The 
Case of Sweden. UES 558. PhLic thesis 
Samakovlis, Eva (2001) Economics of Paper Recycling. Efficiency, policies, and 
substitution possibilities. UES 563. PhD thesis 
Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov (2001) Essays on Intra-Household Allocation and Policy 
Regime Shifts. UES 570. PhD thesis Hellström, Jörgen (2002) Count Data Modelling and Tourism Demand. UES 584. 
PhD thesis 
Andersson, Linda (2002) Essays on Job Turnover, Productivity and State-Local 
Finance. UES 586. PhD thesis 
Rashid, Saman (2002) Invandrarinkomster, förvärvsdeltagande och familj. UES 
588. PhLic thesis 
Hanes, Niklas (2003) Empirical Studies in Local Public Finance: Spillovers, 
Amalgamations, and Tactical Redistributions. UES 604. PhD thesis 
Stenberg, Anders (2003) An Evaluation of the Adult Education Initiative Relative 
Labor Market Training. UES 609. PhD thesis 
Stage, Jesper (2003) Mixing Oil and Water. Studies of the Namibian Economy. 
UES 611. PhD thesis 
Marklund, Per-Olov (2004) Essays on Productive Efficiency, Shadow Prices, and 
Human Capital. UES 621. PhD thesis 
Rashid, Saman (2004) Immigrants' Income and Family Migration. UES 625. PhD 
thesis 
Sandberg, Krister (2004) Hedonic Prices, Economic Growth, and Spatial 
Dependence. UES 631. PhD thesis 
Sjöström, Magnus (2004) Factor Demand and Market Power. UES 633. PhD 
thesis 
Nilsson, William (2005) Equality of Opportunity, Heterogeneity and Poverty. 
UES 652. PhD thesis 
Quoreshi, Shahiduzzaman (2005) Modelling High Frequency Financial Count 
Data. UES 656. Ph Lic thesis 
Ankarhem, Mattias (2005) Bioenergy, Pollution, and Economic Growth. UES 
661. PhD thesis 
Quoreshi, Shahiduzzaman (2006) Time Series Modelling of High Frequency 
Stock Transaction Data. UES 675. PhD thesis Ghalwash, Tarek (2006) Income, Energy Taxation, and the Environment. An 
Econometric Analysis. UES 678. PhD thesis 
Westerberg, Thomas (2006) Two Papers on Fertility – The Case of Sweden. UES 
683. Ph Lic thesis 
Simonsen, Ola (2006) Stock Data, Trade Durations, and Limit Order Book 
Information. UES 689. PhD thesis 
Eliasson, Kent (2006) College Choice and Earnings among University Graduates 
in Sweden. UES 693. PhD thesis 
Selander, Carina (2006) Chartist Trading in Exchange Rate Theory. UES 698. 
PhD thesis 
Humavindu, Michael N (2007) Essays on Public Finance and Environmental 
Economics in Namibia. UES 705. Ph Lic thesis 
Norberg-Schönfeldt, Magdalena (2007) The Phase-Out of the Nuclear Family? 
Empirical Studies on the Economics and Structure of Modern Swedish 
Families. UES 708. PhD thesis 
Granlund, David (2007) Economic Policy in Health Care: Sickness Absence and 
Pharmaceutical Costs. UES 710. PhD thesis 
Jonsson, Thomas (2007) Essays on Agricultural and Environmental Policy. UES 
719. PhD thesis 
Broberg, Thomas (2007) The Value of Preserving Nature – Preference 
Uncertainty and Distributional Effects. UES 720. PhD thesis 
Witterblad, Mikael (2008) Essays on Redistribution and Local Public 
Expenditures. UES 731. PhD thesis 
Thunström, Linda (2008) Food Consumption, Paternalism and Economic Policy. 
UES 739. PhD thesis 
Humavindu, Michael N (2008) Essays on the Namibian Economy. UES 745. PhD 
thesis 
Persson, Lars (2008) Environmental Policy and Transboundary Externalities - 
Coordination and Commitment in Open Economies. UES 755. PhD 
thesis Sahlén, Linda (2008) Essays on Environmental and Development Economics - 
Public Policy, Resource Prices and Global Warming. UES 762. PhD 
thesis 
 
Lönnbark, Carl (2009) On Risk Prediction. UES 770. PhD thesis 
 
Norin, Anna (2009) Worker Safety and Market Dynamics. UES 772. PhLic thesis 
 
Holmlund, Linda (2009) Essays on Child Care and Higher Education. UES 783. 
PhD thesis 
 
Landström, Mats (2009) Two essays on Central Bank Independence Reforms. 
UES 792. PhLic thesis 
 
Åström, Johanna (2009) Marriage, Money and Migration. UES 790. PhD thesis 
 
Birkelöf, Lena (2009) Spatial Interaction and Local Government Expenditures for 
Functionally Impaired in Sweden. UES 798. PhD thesis 
 
Mannberg, Andrea (2010) Risk and Rationality – Effects of contextual risk and 
cognitive dissonance on (sexual) incentives. UES 806. PhD thesis 
 
Andersson, Camilla (2010) Changing the Risk at the Margin: Smallholder 
Farming and Public Policy in Developing Countries. UES 810. PhD 
thesis 